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1. INTRODUCTION
Oil may have put Texas on the map,' but water is what it needs to stay there. While
other states struggled economically in recent years, Texas flourished. 2 Since 1995, the
number of jobs in Texas increased 31.5% as compared to the national average of just
12%.3 The majority of the job growth occurred in Texas cities.4 In fact, four of 2013's
ten fastest growing cities are located in Texas.' Although many industries expanded, the
mining and logging sector, which includes the oil and natural gas industries, was notably
strong.6 Population projections reflect the same growth trend. Texas's population is forecasted to increase 82% in the next fifty years.7 This growth is predicated on access to
water resources. 8 The future of Texas is not definite; however, it is certain that none of
this growth can continue without water.
Groundwater is a critical component of Texas water resources. According to the
most recent statistics, groundwater accounts for 60% of all water withdrawn in the state. 9
Historically, the largest groundwater user was the agricultural sector; however, Texas
cities are also increasingly reliant on these water sources.10 State water demands are
projected to increase 22% in the next fifty years." Many of these demands will be in the
groundwater sector. In addition to increasing demand, periodic and sometimes severe
droughts challenge an already stressed system.12 Texas's ability to provide sufficient resources depends in large part on their effective management.
The laws governing Texas groundwater have followed a long and complicated path
consisting of case law and legislation.'1 The common law of groundwater allocation was
first established by the Texas Supreme Court in 1904, which held that Texas should

1
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See generally Mary G. Ramos, Oil and Texas: A Cultural History, TEXAS ALMANAC, http://
www.texasalmanac.com/topics/business/oil-and-texas-cultural-history (last visited May 25,
2013).
Wendell Cox, The Texas Growth Machine, CiTY J., Winter 2013, http://www.city-journal.org
/2013/231_texas-growth.html.
Id.
Id.
Morgan Brennan, America's Fastest Growing Cities, FORBES (Jan. 23, 2013, 6:00am), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/morganbrennan/2013/01/23/americas-fastest-growing-cities/.
Comptroller's Weekly Economic Outlook, TEX. ECON., http://www.thetexaseconomy.org/
economic-outlook/ (last updated May 24, 2013). Those industries alone added an estimated
40,000 jobs in 2011. Id.
TEx. WATER DEV. BD., WATER FOR TEXAS: 2012 STATE WATER PLAN 1 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 STATE WATER PLAN], available at http://www.twdb.state.tx.us/publications/state
water._plan/2012/2012_SWP.pdf.
Id.
Id. at 163 (citing the 2008 Texas Water Development Board Water Use Survey).
Id.; 2010 Texas Water Use Estimates, TEX. WATER DEV. BOARD, http://www.twdb.state.tx.us/
waterplanning/waterusesurvey/estimates/2010/index.asp (follow "2010 Water Use Survey
Summary Estimates - Regional & State Totals" hyperlink) (last visited April 14, 2013).
2012 STATE WATER PLAN, supra note 7, at 3.
Jake Silverstein, Life by the Drop, TEX. MONTHLY, July 2012, at 101.
See infra Parts III-VI.
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follow the English common law right of capture.' 4 Under right of capture, one landowner can drain the water from under his neighbor's property without liability with few
exceptions." The Court reasoned that this rule was preferable because of the scientific
complications associated with trying to regulate groundwater and the impacts regulation
may have on commerce.' 6
Rule of capture has been upheld by subsequent cases; however, on several occasions
the Court has been critical of this allocation scheme and indicated that this rule should
be changed by the legislature." Those opinions recognized the need for greater management based oin changing circumstances in the state.' 8 Most notably, in Sipriano v. Great
Spring Waters of America, Inc., the Court went so far as to indicate that if the legislature
did not change the law, the Court would.' 9
A state constitutional amendment vested the authority to manage and conserve natural resources with the legislature.20 Pursuant to this authority, the state created
Groundwater Conservation Districts (GCDs) instead of forming a statewide regulatory
agency. 2 ' The state preferred districts because they provided a regional, bottom-up approach to planning that is more suitable for managing individual aquifers.2 2 These legislatively created districts have the authority to permit groundwater wells based on well
spacing to minimize interference between wells and set production limits based on tract
size or production capacity.2 3 There are currently one hundred GCDs, but there are still
areas of the state outside district authority.2 4 In these areas, rule of capture continues
unfettered.25
Another significant regulatory initiative was the creation and expansion of the regional planning process. Through two omnibus state water bills and other supporting
legislation, state lawmakers created a statewide water-planning program. 26 As part of
this initiative, the state was divided into sixteen groundwater management areas

14
15
16
17
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19
20
21
22
23
24

25
26

Houston & T. C. Ry. Co. v. East, 81 S.W. 279, 280-82 (Tex. 1904).
Id.
Id. at 281.
See, e.g., Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75, 78-80 (Tex. 1999)
(discussing at length the courts' continuing refusal to abandon the common law rule of
capture, though some aspects were considered "harsh and outmoded," and the recognition
that water regulation in Texas is a legislative prerogative).
Id.
See id. at 80.
TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 5 9 (a).
TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.0015 (West 2012).
See Sipriano, 1 S.W.3d at 80.
TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.116 (West 2012).
Groundwater ConservationDistrict (GCD) FAQs, TEX. WATER DEVELOPMENT BOARD, http:/
/www.twdb.state.tx.us/groundwater/faq/ (last visited April 14, 2013) (follow "GCD map"
hyperlink to see areas of the state outside district authority).
45 Douglas G. Caroom, Susan M. Maxwell, & Celina Romero, Texas Practice Series: Environmental Law § 14.2 (2d ed. 2005 & Supp. 2012).
See infra Part IV.A-B.
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(GMAs), which roughly parallel aquifer boundaries.27 These areas were then tasked
with selecting desired future conditions for the aquifer, which is essentially a decision
regarding the preferred aquifer conditions in fifty years. 28 Based on that decision, individual GCDs within a GMA were tasked with permitting water withdrawals mindful of
that goal.29 Implementation of permitting rules to attain these future targets heralded a
level of regulation that had never before occurred.
Over the years, as capture was maintained by the courts and additional regulations
were promulgated, questions arose regarding the specifics of the property right created by
the common law rule.30 Although the Court stated on multiple occasions that capture
was the law, neither the court nor lawmakers ever specified if ownership in that water
vested in place or upon capture.3 1 While the answer to this question did not have a
significant impact when there was eniough water for all users, the need for an answer
increased as water supplies became scarcer. The specific question of ownership was finally brought before the Court in Edwards Aquifer Authority v. Day. In its ruling, the
Court stated unequivocally that ownership rights vest in place. Defining the right i*n
place limits the extent to which districts can regulate groundwater before it becomes a
regulatory taking. Unfortunately for regulators, the Court did not define where that
limit is.
The Day ruling was extremely controversial and led to many conversations about
how much regulation was acceptable, but the ruling was compelling for another reason.
The Day opinion denoted a departure from previous groundwater cases. 32 While previous cases criticized capture and deferred to legislative initiatives to regulate, often encouraging more limits, this decision did not.3 3 Instead, the opinion focused on oil and
gas law and private property rights.34 This article seeks to explain this shift by evaluating the historic conversation between the.Texas Supreme Court and the Texas Legislature on groundwater.
This paper evaluates the Day decision through the lens of past court decisions and
legislation in an effort to understand the Court's ruling. Part II introduces Texas's
groundwater resources, current uses of that water, and present concerns regarding sustainability.31 Part III chronicles the line of cases that established capture as the common
law rule in Texas.36 Part IV traces the history of groundwater legislation after courts

27

See, e.g., Groundwater Management Areas, TEX. WATER DEV. BOARD, http://www.

twdb.state.tx.us/groundwater/managementareas/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2013) (displaying a
map of the 16 Groundwater Management Areas).
28

29
30
31
32

Robert E. Mace et al., A Streetcar Named Desired Future Conditions: The New Groundwater
Availability for Texas (Revised), in THE CHANGING FACE OF WATER RIGHTS IN TEXAS ch.

2.1, at 2-3 (State Bar of Texas eds., 2008), available at http://www.twdb.state.tx.us/groundwater/docs/Streetcar.pdf.
TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.1132.
See infra Part VI.A-B.
See infra Part VI.A-B.
See infra Part VII.

33

Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 831-32 (Tex. 2012).

34
35
36

Id.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.A-B.
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established rule of capture.3 7 This legislation created a regulatory overlay on the common law rule of capture through localized groundwater conservation districts and the
statewide planning process.38 Part V describes the process through which the Edwards
Aquifer Authority came into existence and how its pumping cap immediately raised
property rights concerns. 9 Part VI explains how groundwater litigation shifted from
right of capture limitations to questions of when ownership vests. 40 This change was a
product of increased pressure on groundwater resources caused by additional regulations
and growing population demands.41
Finally, Part VII presents three hypotheses regarding why the Court came to its decision in the Day case, despite the case law history.42 The first theory is that delineation
of property interests is an issue reserved for courts' authority.43 Another alternative is
that the holding in Day was a result of a statewide shift towards the protection of private
property rights above other concerns.44 The final proposed alternative is that the Day
holding was actually an effort to define the property right in such a way as to encourage
more regulation, or at least limit takings claims, through the extension of correlative
rights to groundwater.45

II.

TEXAS GROUNDWATER

Texans have a long-standing dependence on groundwater.46 Its usage has steadily
increased throughout the state's history.47 From early in the state's history, farmers required groundwater for their livelihoods. In the 1930s, groundwater was an essential tool
in stopping the seemingly endless Dust Bowl in the Texas Panhandle and returning the

37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
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46

47

See infra Part IV.A-B.
See infra Part IV.A-B..
See infra Part V.A-C.
See infra Part VIA-C
See infra Part VIA-C.
See infra Part VII.A-C.
See infra Part VII.A.
See infra Part VII.B.
See infra Part VII.C.
Groundwater is defined by the Texas Water Code as "water percolating below the surface of
the earth." TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.001(5) (West 2012). This definition can be
misleading, as underflow of a stream is actually considered surface water and therefore under
state control. Id. § 11.021(a). Implementing regulations of Texas water rights supply additional details to the definition. Groundwater is "[wlater under the surface of the ground
other than underflow of a stream and underground streams, whatever may be the geologic
structure in which it is standing or moving." 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 297.1(21) (2012).
Once groundwater leaves the ground in the form of springs or discharges into a river, its
legal character changes and it becomes surface water. IDenis v. Kickapoo Land Co., 771
S.W.2d 235, 236 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ denied).
PETER G. GEORGE ET AL., TEX. WATER DEV. BD., AQUIFERS OF TEXAS, REPORT 380, at 10
(2011), available at http://www.twdb.state.tx.us/publications/reports/numbered-reports/doc/
R380_AquifersofTexas.pdf.
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area from a wasteland to a thriving agricultural economy.48 The majority of rivers that
start in Central Texas and flow across the state to the bays and estuaries find their
headwaters in groundwater-fed springs, without which the state could not provide sufficient surface water for many users. 49 In addition, the seventh largest city in the United
States, San Antonio, relies almost entirely on the Edwards Aquifer for its survival.0
Texas has nine major aquifers and twenty-one minor aquifers. 5' In 2008, groundwater provided nearly 60% of the water used throughout the state.5 2 This. amounted to
9.66 million acre-feet per year.53 The vast majority, 80%, of this water was used for
irrigation.54 35% of municipal demands are met by groundwater, although this percentage may increase in the future, as surface water is increasingly unavailable.5 5 State water
demands are projected to increase 22% in the next fifty years.5 6 Even with a projected
decrease in irrigation demand, the demand for groundwater will continue to increase.5 7
This ever-growing, intensifying dependence on groundwater coupled with legal questions
regarding regulation threatens the viability of many of these resources.58 Some of these
impacts are already visible.
While droughts are not new to Texas, additional stressors can turn a temporary inconvenience into a sustainability threat.59 The state's population is predicted to increase
82% between 2010 and 2060.60 The vast majority of these citizens will live in urban
areas, stressing cities' current water supplies.61 New water supply plans for municipal
areas often include desalination of brackish aquifers or pumping and long-haul transport
of groundwater from one region of the state to another. 62 In other areas, where drought
.48
49
50

51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59

60
61
62

Jon Mark Beilue, Methods Prevent Another Dust Bowl, AMARILLO GLOBE-NEWS, Apr. 11,
2010, http://amarillo.com/stories/041110/newnews7.shtml.
See generally GEORGE ET AL., supra note 47 (providing summaries of all major and minor
Texas aquifers, including the springs associated with each aquifer).
Texas: San Antonio, San Antonio Protects Edwards Aquifer, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION
AGENCY (Jan. 2010), http://water.epa.gov/infrastructure/drinkingwater/sourcewater/protection/casestudies/upload/Source-Water-Case-Study-TX-SanAntonio.pdf.
GEORGE ET AL., supra note 47, at 3.
2012 STATE WATER PLAN, supra note 7, at 163.
An acre-foot is equal to 325,851 gallons of water.
2012 STATE WATER PLAN, supra note 7, at 163.
Id. at 163-64. Municipal uses accounted for fifteen percent of total groundwater withdrawals. Id. at-163.
Id. at 3, 136.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 164-65.
Silverstein, supra note 12, at 101; Chris Tomlinson, Water Percolates Up Texas Legislature's
Agenda, Lubbock Avalanche-J., Dec. 9, 2012, http://lubbockonline.com/filed-online/201212-09/water-percolates-texas-legislatures-agenda#.UMdiFJK313t.
2012 STATE WATER PLAN, supra note 7, at 1.
See id. at 3 (stating that demand for municipal water will increase from 4.9 million acre-feet
in 2010 to 8.4 million acre-feet in 2060).
Kate Galbraith, IndustrialEvolution, TEX. MONTHLY 130 (July 2012) [hereinafter Galbraith,
Industrial Evolution]; Kate Galbraith, Texas' Water Woes Spark Interest in Desalination, TEX.
TRIB. (June 10, 2012), http://www.texastribune.org/texas-environmental-news/water-supply/texas-water-woes-spark-interest-desalination/ [hereinafter Galbraith, Water Woes]; 2012
STATE WATER PLAN, supra note 7, at 193-95. There are currently forty-four brackish water
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and over-allocation have reduced surface water resources, some citizens have starting
drilling personal groundwater wells.63 Unfortunately, in regions where the groundwater
is hydrologically connected to nearby surface water sources, withdrawal of the groundwater reduces the available surface water. 64 These realities, viewed in light of climate
change predictions for the region, paint a bleak picture and raise questions about how
the state's aquifers will survive.65
66
The same region of Texas that suffered from the Dust Bowl is again under threat.
The Ogallala Aquifer located in the Texas Panhandle recently experienced the'largest
one-year decline in twenty-five years. 67 In 2011, Texas suffered a drought that exceeded
the dryness experienced in any single year during the severe drought of the fifties. 68 The
2011 drought greatly depleted surface and groundwater resources and wildfires raged
throughout the state. 69 Even before the 2011 drought, the Ogallala Aquifer was declining at an average of /4 of a foot per year. 70 Because the Ogallala is a non-recharging

63
64

65
66

67

68

69

70

desalination plants in Texas used for public water supplies, and ten additional units have
been approved for construction. Galbraith, Water Woes, supra.
Kate Galbraith, Texas Drought Sparks Water Well DrillingFrenzy, TEX. TRIB. (Feb. 17, 2012),
http://www.texastribune.org/2012/02/1 7/texas-drought-sparks-water-well-drilling-frenzy/.
Thomas C. Winter et al., U.S Geological Survey, Circular 1139, Ground Water and Surface Water: A Singular Resource 2-5 (1998), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/circ1139/
pdf/circl 139.pdf.
Galbraith, Industrial Evolution, supra note 62, at 132.
See Peter Miller, The New Dust Bowl, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Sept. 2012, at 58; Kate Galbraith, Drought Caused Big Drop in Texas Portion of Ogallala, TEX. TRIB. (July 3, 2012), http:/
/www.texastribune.org/2012/07/03/drought-caused-huge-drop-texas-portion-ogallala/ [hereinafter Galbraith, Drought Caused Big Drop].
Galbraith, Drought Caused Big Drop, supra note 66. Monitoring wells in the southern panhandle dropped an average of two and a half feet in just over a year. Id. Northernmost
areas of the panhandle, near the Oklahoma border, measured almost a three-foot drop in
water levels as the drought raged on. Id. Rainfall in Lubbock measured only 5.86 inches for
2011. Sandra Postel, That Sinking Feeling About Groundwater in Texas, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC
(July 19, 2012), http://newswatch.nationalgeographic.com/2012/07/19/that-sinking-feelingabout-groundwater-in-texas/.
Silverstein, supra note12, at 100; John Burnett, When the Sky Ran Dry, TEX. MONTHLY, July
2012, at 107 (chronicling the impact of the drought of the fifties on Texans). The drought
of the 1950s, which lasted from 1947 and 1957, is often referred to as the "drought of
record" because it is the benchmark to which all other droughts in Texas are compared.
Farzad Mashhood, Current Drought Pales in Comparison with 1950s "Drought of Record," AusTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Aug. 4, 2011, http://www.statesman.com/news/news/local/currentdrought-pales-in-comparison-with-1950s-d-1/nRdC5/; see 2012 STATE WATER PLAN, supra
note 7, at 1.
Craig Kanalley, Texas Wildfires 2011: Season Among Worst In State History, HUFFINGTON
PosT (Apr. 11, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/11/texas-wildfires-2011video-n-847776.html.
Kate Galbraith, Texas Farmers Battle Ogallala Pumping Limits, TEX. TRIB. (Mar. 18,
2012),http://www.texastribune.org/2012/03/18/texas-farmers-regulators-battle-over-ogallala/
[hereinafter Galbraith, Texas Farmers Battle].
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aquifer, these declines will eventually force a permanent shift in the High Plains economy unless considerable changes are implemented.'
The Ogallala is not alone. Recent monitoring of wells in aquifers across the state
revealed significant water level declines ranging in severity from fifty feet to more than
one thousand feet. 72 Dewatering is not the only reason to limit pumping. For example,
access to water in the Gulf Coast Aquifer is restricted despite sufficient water availability
because extraction created problematic subsidence.7 In the next fifty years, available
groundwater supplies are projected to decrease 30%, primarily due to the depletion of the
Ogallala Aquifer and reduced supply from the Gulf Coast Aquifer as a result of
mandatory subsidence reductions.74
Despite these prognostics, many landowners remain opposed to increased groundwater regulation, seeing it as an invasion of private property rights.75 To understand this

seemingly illogical viewpoint, it is important to understand the evolution of groundwater
rights in Texas-any discussion of which must begin with the rule of capture established
by the Texas Supreme Court in Houston & T. C. Railway Co. v. East.76

Ill.

ESTABLISHING THE RIGHT OF CAPTURE

The legal road to groundwater in Texas is paved by a series -of legal and legislative

decisions made somewhat in tandem with, or at least in recognition of, one another.
When considered this way-viewing each court and legislative decision as one in a series-the progression in groundwater regulation becomes clearer. Sometimes there appears to be a direct concert between the legislature and the judiciary, each one
respecting and deferring to the other. Other times, legislative deference is replaced with
the subtleties of persuasion that courts often provide to legislators.77 While the common
law clearly established the rule of capture, several subsequent decisions and a series of
legislative efforts added asterisks to the Court's East decision and modified it.
A. STARTING

WITH EAST

Any discussion of groundwater law in Texas must begin with the Texas Supreme
Court's 1904 ruling in East.7 8 This case established the rule of capture as the law for

Texas groundwater.79

71

Id.

72

GEORGE ET AL., supra note
2012 STATE WATER PLAN,

73
74
75

47, at 8; 2012 STATE
supra note 7, at 165.

WATER PLAN,

supra note 7, at 8.

Id. at 164.

77
78

See ejg., Galbraith, Texas Farmers Battle, supra note 70 (describing farmers' resentment towards the new rules promulgated by High Plains Underground Water Conservation
District).
See Houston & T. C. Ry. Co. v. East, 81 S.W. 279 (Tex. 1904).
See GuiDo CALABRESI, A CoMMoN LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 164 (1982).
See East, 81 S.W. at 279.

79

Id. at 280-82.

76
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In East, the Houston Railroad Company had several lots upon which it built a large
groundwater well and attached it to a steam pump. 0 The pump withdrew 25,000 gallons
of water each day, which caused East's much smaller, neighboring residential well to go
dry. 81 Despite East's injury, the Court held that Houston Railroad Company's use was
reasonable and not actionable.8 2 The Court explained that the landowner has equal
ownership of the soil and the water held therein.83 The Court reached this conclusion
for two reasons: first, the Court stated that groundwater was too complicated to govern
any other way; and second, requiring correlative rights would interfere with economic
development.* The only exception to this rule appeared to be that groundwater use
must be absent evidence of malice or willful waste.85
East was a case of first impression for the Court and Texas had no laws governing
groundwater at the time of its disposition. Without other guidance, the Court relied on
the experiences of other jurisdictions and English common law to reach its conclusion.86
In particular, the Court cited Acton v. Lundell, a case from 1843.87 Despite its reliance
on common law, the Court posited that legislation would have guided its decision had
the legislature previously created any regulations for groundwater.88
Since 1904, many things in Texas have changed, including increased water demand
and scarcity. Some argued that the need for water created a conflict between the right of
capture as outlined in East and lasting groundwater sustainability. These concerns have
resurfaced many times since the East decision. In the years after the East decision, several cases involving groundwater trickled into Texas courts. Although allocation regulatory regimes were not the primary question, the Texas Supreme Court confirmed that
rule of capture was still the law.
Texas Company v. Burkett involved a contract for the sale and transport of water
from several sources, including groundwater. 89 The focus of the opinion was on the
validity of the contact; however, the Court made clear that any percolating water would

80
81
82
83

84

85
86
87
88
89

Id. at 280.
Id.
Id. at 280-81.
Id. ("'That the person who owns the surface may dig therein and apply all that is there
found to his own purposes . . . and that if, in the exercise of such right, he intercepts or
drains off the water collected from the underground springs in his neighbor's well, this ...
falls within the description of damnum absque injuria, which cannot become the ground of
an action."' (quoting Acton v. Blundell, 12 Mees. & W. 324, 152 Eng. Rep. 1233 (1843))).
East, 81 S.W. at 281. Correlative rights limit a landowner's right to a resource, such as
groundwater, to his or her reasonable share. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858
(1979). This share is often based on the amount of land owned by each on the surface. Id.
The El Paso Court of Appeals specifically stated that correlative rights were not a part of
Texas law and that the current rule of capture actually precludes its application. Pecos Co.
Water Control & Imp. Dist. No. 1 v. Williams, 271 S.W.2d 503, 505-06 (Tex. Civ.
App.-EI Paso 1954, writ refd n.r.e.).
East, 81 S.W. at 281-82.
Id.
Id. at 280-82 (citing Acton, 12 Mees. & W. 324, 152 Eng. Rep. 1233)).
Id. at 280 (citing Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294 (1861)).
Texas Co. v. Burkett, 296 S.W. 273, 273-74 (Tex. 1927).
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be the "exclusive property of the owner of the surface of the soil."90 The Court distinguished this property right from that created in surface water, which was only a right of
use. 9' The transport of water was again the principal topic in City of Corpus Christi v.
City of Pleasanton.92 This case concerned an effort to enjoin the Lower Nueces River
Supply District and Corpus Christi from routing flow from an artesian well into a
riverbed and transporting it over 118 miles to Corpus Christi.9 3 Plaintiffs issue was the
large amount of waste that occurred along the journey through evaporation, transpiration, and seepage.9 4 Citing Acton and East, the Court stated the surface owner has absolute ownership of the water held within, encumbered only by the common law
limitations of waste and malicious intent.95 The Court did not, however, endorse
waste.9 6 It simply stated that the determination of what constitutes waste was within the
jurisdiction of the legislature. 97 In its more recent opinion in Friendswood Development
Co. v. Smith-Southwest Industries, Inc., the Court again upheld the right of capture, but
added subsidence caused by negligent groundwater removal as a limitation on permissible capture. 98
Although these cases indirectly confirmed the rule of capture, Texas courts did not
directly address the question of whether the rule of capture should remain the law for
groundwater for almost one hundred years after East. Meanwhile, the state was growing
along with its water needs, which continued to raise questions and concerns about the
wisdom of this common law doctrine.
B. CAPTURING SIPRIANO
In 1999, the Texas Supreme Court had its first modem opportunity to directly confront the question of whether the rule of capture remained the appropriate method of
groundwater allocation for Texas.9 9 In Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of America, the
defendant, Ozarka Natural Spring Water, began pumping nearly 90,000 gallons of
groundwater every day for bottling and sale.100 The pumping quickly depleted Sipriano's
nearby wells.101 Among other requests, Sipriano asked the Court to abandon the rule of
capture and replace it with the rule of reasonable use. 1 02 The court refused to do so. 0 3
Deferring to its ruling in East, the Court maintained the rule of capture as the law in
Texas. 104
90

Id. at 278.

91

Id.

92
93
94
96

City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 276 S.W.2d 798, 799 (Tex. 1955).
Id. at 799-800.
Id. Evidence showed that 63 to 74% of the water placed into the river for transport was lost
through evaporation, transpiration, and seepage. Id. at 800.
Id. at 800-01.
Id.

97
98

Id.
Friendswood Dev. Co. v. Smith-Sw. Indus., Inc., 576 S.W.2d 21, 22, 25-26 (Tex. 1978).

95

99 Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75 (Tex. 1999).
100 Id. at 75-76.
101 Id. at 76.
102 Id.
103 Id.

104 Id. at 79.
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Although the Court upheld East, its opinion indicated that capture may not be appropriate in the future or even at the time of the opinion. 0 5 The Court relied heavily
on legislative deference to avoid deviation from the common law.' 0 6 Citing several legislative initiatives pertaining to groundwater, the Court made it clear that the capitol
should be the source of any changes to allocation principles.107 Specifically, the Court
deferred heavily to the recently passed Senate Bill 1's (SB 1) initiative to increase the
authority of groundwater districts. 0 The ruling did not endorse the wisdom of the rule
of capture. Instead, the Court stated such a decision was not yet within its authority. i09
Throughout the opinion, the Court qualified its ruling by stating that, while it was not
appropriate for the court to take action on right of capture "at this time," it was not
outside the court's bounds to do so at a later date, should the circumstances necessitate
it.' 110

Courts often change the rule of law in response to changed circumstances."' In
Sipriano, the Court acknowledged this practice, stating, "We do not shy away from
change when it is appropriate."ll 2 The Court recognized that one of the primary conditions upon which it relied in East was no longer present." 3 In particular, the Court
rejected East's characterization of groundwater as "occult" and thus unable to be regulated.' '1 Moreover, the Court specifically stated that facts such as those presented in
Sipriano provided compelling reasons to regulate groundwater."' Still, no change was
made." 16
Some of the strongest language against the wisdom of maintaining capture came
from Justice Hecht's concurrence. Justice Hecht stated that, "[w]hat really hampers
groundwater management is the established alternative, the common law rule of capture,

105

106
107

108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116

Id. at 79. Other states faced with the same question decided to overrule capture. See e.g.,
Lawrence J. Wolfe & Jennifer G. Hager, Wyoming's GroundwaterLaws: Quantity and Quality
Regulation, 24 LAND & WATER L. REv. 39, 42-45 (1989). In Wyoming, like in Texas, the
state supreme court first adopted rule of capture near the turn of the century when pumping
was minimal. Hunt v. City of Laramie, 181 P. 137 (Wyo. 1919). However, within a couple
of decades, rapidly increasing groundwater use for irrigation raised questions regarding the
wisdom of capture. Wolfe & Hager, supra, at 43. In the early 1940s, the state engineer
urged the legislature to replace capture with prior appropriation, which the state did for the
first time in 1947, adding more details in 1957. Wolfe & Hager, supra, at 43-45.
Sipriano, 1 S.W.3d at 76-83.
Id. at 79-80; see discussion infra Part IV.A. The court also cited the 1917 constitutional
amendment tasking the legislature with the responsibility of resource management. Sipriano, 1 S.W.3d at 79-80.
Sipriano, 1 S.W.3d at 79-80.
Id.
Id. at 75, 80-81.
See CALABRESI, supra note 77, at 166 ("[Tlhe judicial common law would attach to statutory rules that are out of phase just as much as to common law precedents or doctrines.").
Sipriano, 1 S.W.3d at 80.
Id. at 77 (citing City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 276 S.W.2d 798, 801 (Tex.
1955)).
Sipriano, 1 S.W.3d at 80.
Id.
Id.
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which entitles a landowner to withdraw an unlimited amount of groundwater."I
He
further noted that all of the western states cited in East that followed the rule of capture
replaced the rule with other regimes." 8 He pointed to oil and gas law to debunk the
concept that underground materials cannot be effectively regulated, and went on to say
that it is "not regulation that threatens progress, but the lack of it."" 9
Justice Hecht noted the parties' failure to put forth any effective reason to maintain
capture as the preferred method of management.120 Simply arguing that capture has
been the rule for many years, or that change would be disruptive, was not an acceptable
rationale.121 Reviewing the Second Restatement of Torts, Justice Hecht explained that,
"[w]hile neither [the Restatement] nor any other common law rule of water regulation is
preferable to almost any legislative solution, absent a solution, [the Restatement] is preferable to the rule of capture." 2 2 Despite this strong language, Justice Hecht remained
with the majority in maintaining East "for now" to provide SB 1, and its efforts to empower district regulations, time to play out. 2 3 As the case law pertaining to the common law rule of capture continued to develop, so did legislative regulations.

IV.

THE LEGISLATURE SPEAKS

While Texas courts consistently upheld the rule of capture,. the legislature was simultaneously limiting groundwater rights through regulation. This began just six years after
the Texas Supreme Court's decision in East, when the droughts of 1910 and 1917 motivated the legislature to amend the state constitution to explicitly extend the legislature's
obligations to include the duty to protect the state's natural resources.124 This amendment was not self-enacting, but, through its passage, the duty to implement public policy
relating to groundwater was placed squarely with the legislature.125
Unlike surface water, groundwater was not enumerated as a natural resource in the
article, but the article did contain a general reference to water under which groundwater
would likely be included.126 Courts have cited this amendment to support the argument
that the judiciary is not the appropriate authority to implement laws limiting groundwater production.127 However, because the amendment passed after East, the Court had
already established a common law regulation. A common law rule of capture evolving

117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124

125

126
127

Id. at 81 (Hecht, J., concurring).
Id. at 81-82.
Sipriano, 1 S.W.3d at 82.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 83.
Id. at 83; see discussion infra Part IV.A.
Sipriano, 1 S.W.3d at 77; see TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 5 9(a) ("The conservation and development of all of the natural resources of this State . . . and the preservation and conservation of all such natural resources of the State are each and all hereby declared public rights
and duties; and the Legislature shall pass all such laws as may be appropriate thereto.").
See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59(a).
Id.
See e.g., Sipriano, 1 S.W.3d at 79-80.
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contemporaneously with a regulatory structure seeking to regulate groundwater rights
created a bifurcated system that continues to create confusion regarding how far the
legislature can go in limiting the common law right.
Potential conflicts aside, the legislature took on the responsibility of governing
groundwater primarily through Groundwater Conservation Districts.(GCDs). A GCD's
purpose is "to provide for the conservation, preservation, protection, recharging, and
prevention of waste of groundwater, and of groundwater reservoirs or their subdivisions,
and to control subsidence caused by withdrawal of water from those groundwater reservoirs or their subdivisions, consistent with the objectives of Section 59, Article XVI, [of
the] Texas Constitution." 28 Texas's legislature first provided for GCDs in 1949 pursuant to the constitutional authority it received through the conservation amendment.12 9
Districts are Texas's preferred method of groundwater management because they authorize local control by those most familiar with the resource and most affected by any
regulation. 30 Subsequent regulations have increased the authority of GCDs and
strengthened the state's regional planning process.' 3' This has led to increased pumping
limits in some areas. 132 In other special circumstances, such as in the Edwards Aquifer, a
firm pumping cap was established.' 3 3
A.

THE GROWTH OF DISTRICTS

The Article 59 constitutional amendment authorized the creation of GCDs in 1917;
however, by 1996, only thirty-four districts had been created.'13 Although water issues
would commonly surface after dry years, the state had enough resources to meet most
needs, which avoided the demand for additional districts or statewide regulation. The
lack of districts changed in 1997 with Texas's first historic omnibus water bill: SB 1.13s
SB 1 marked the first attempt to shift from water development to statewide regional

128 TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.0015 (West 2012).
129 Sipriano, 1 S.W.3d at 79; TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59(b) ("There may be created within the
State of Texas, or the State may be divided into, such number of conservation and reclamation districts as may be determined to be essential to the accomplishment of the purposes of
this amendment to the constitution, which districts shall be governmental agencies and
bodies politic and corporate with such powers of government and with the authority to
exercise such rights, privileges and functions concerning the subject matter of this amendment as may be conferred by law.").
130 TEX. WATER DEV. BD., AQUIFERS OF THE GULF COAST OF TEXAS 299-301(2006), available
at http://www.twdb.texas.gov/publications/reports/numbered-reports/doc/R365/R365
Composite.pdf.
131 See discussion infra Part IV.A.
132 See discussion infra Part IV.B.
133
134

See discussion infra Part IV.C.2.
See Groundwater Conservation Districts, TEX. WATER DEV. BD. (Jan. 2013), http://www.

135

twdb.state.tx.us/mapping/doc/maps/gcd-only_8x 11.pdf.
See Act of June 1, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1010, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 3610 (codified in
various sections of TEX. WATER CODE). There have been two other omnibus water bills:

Senate Bills 2 and 3. Act of May 27, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 966, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws
1991; Acts 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 1430, 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws 5848.
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planning.136 As with most water legislation in Texas, SB 1 came on the heels of a threeyear drought.137 That harsh reality, coupled with Texas's growth rate projections and a
realization that the state water plan was not being properly implemented, created a leadership moment in Texas water history in which the legislature sought to invigorate the
planning process and provide more effective management. 138
Although SB 1 dealt with a host of water issues, it had profound consequences on
groundwater. Prior to its passage, groundwater management did not exist in many areas
of the state except for the few locations where GCDs existed. SB 1 sought to change
this and explicitly stated that "[g]roundwater conservation districts . . . are the state's
preferred method of groundwater management."' 39 GCDs "embody a central premise of
this legislation-local control-and represent the idea that those closest to the resource
are those most capable of managing it."1 40 After SB 1, the number of groundwater districts grew quickly.'1'
In addition to its goal of expanding the regulatory power of individual districts, SB 1
sought to treat the state as a whole and set up a system of regional planning groups,
which looked at both surface and groundwater resources.' 2 The bill directed these areas
to examine water resources, needs, and projections.143 Each regional planning group was
required to consider all of the included GCDs' management plans.'" Additionally, SB 1
provided for data collection to close data gaps, which had previously made planning
difficult, if not impossible.'" The bill also provided for the creation of Priority Ground-

136 Chris Lehman, Hung Out to Dry?: Groundwater Conservation Districts and the Continuing
Battle to Save Texas's Most Precious Resource, 35 TEX. TECH L. REV. 101, 107-108 (2004).

State planning, as defined by SB 1, included dividing the state into sixteen regional plan-

137
138

139

ning groups, separate and apart from the groundwater management areas, for the purposes of
forecasting and management of both surface water and groundwater resources for inclusion
in the State Water Plan. TEX. WATER DEV. BD., Water for Texas: Regional Water Planningin
Texas (2013), http://www.twdb.texas.gov/publications/shells/RegionalWaterPlanning.pdf
(This article focuses solely on the groundwater portion of the planning process).
Martin Hubert & Bob Bullock, Senate Bill 1, The First Big and Bold Step Toward Meeting
Texas's Future Water Needs, 30 TEX. TECH L. REv. 53, 55 (1999).
Id. at 55-56. SB 1 passed just two years before the Texas Supreme Court's decision in
Sipriano, and is the primary recipient of legislative deference in the court's opinion. See
discussion supra Part IlI.B.
Act of June 1, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1010, § 4.21, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 3610, 3642-43

(codified in TEx. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.0015).
140 Hubert & Bullock, supra note 137, at 66.
141
142

Lehman, supra note 136, at 104.
See Act of June 1, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1010, § 1.02, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 3610,

3611-14 (codified in TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 16.053).
143 Id.
144 Id.

145

Id. § 1.05, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 3610, 3617 (amending TEx. WATER CODE ANN.
§ 15.404).
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water Management Areas.(PGMAs). 146 PGMAs are areas identified as potentially having significant problems within twenty-five years of the bill passing. 4 7
SB 1 consolidated the laws governing GCDs into Chapter 36 of the Texas Water
Code.148 This chapter provides for the creation of GCDs, means of governance, powers,
and duties.149 In addition to emphasizing a preference for GCDs, the bill increased their
statutory authority to manage withdrawals.1so The bill also provided extensive guidance
for the creation of management plans."' Perhaps most importantly, the bill required
landowners to obtain permits .for any newly drilled water wells.152 Permit applications
required users to report their use and submit statements of purpose when applying for
well permits."' Districts could also issue or deny permits for out-of-basin water transfers.'51 Overall, the purpose of SB 1 was to implement groundwater management where
previously absent, but the bill did not attempt to change the common law regarding
statewide groundwater allocation.
Although SB 1 did not change the rule of capture, commentary suggests it did not
endorse it either. A law review, coauthored by the bill's champion, Lt. Governor Bob
Bullock, stated:
Early in the process, the sponsors of the bill decided that the timing was not
right for considering such provisions and that groundwater districts were the
appropriate entity to manage the resource. However, as urban and industrial
water demand continues to grow, these users will be looking for alternate sources
of water to satisfy their needs. When this happens, and property owners are

faced with the prospect of a large water pumper depleting their groundwater
supplies, property owners may begin considering additional ways to protect their

right to use the groundwater.'15

146 Id. § 4.11, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 3610, 3636 (amending TEX. WATER CODE ANN.

§ 35.007(a)).
147
148
149

150
151

Id.
Russell Johnson, Groundwater Law and Regulation, in ESSENTIALS OF TEXAS WATER RESOURCES 4-12 (2nd ed. 2012).
See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 36.001-36.419 (West 2012). Although districts can be
formed several ways, the most common is through legislative action. Johnson, supra note
148, at 114.
Act of June 1, 1997, § 4.21 et. seq., 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 3610, 3642-43 (codified in
various sections of TEX. WATER CODE ANN.).
Id. § 4.28, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 3610, 3644 (codified in TEX. WATER CODE ANN.

§ 36.1071).
152

Id. § 4.30, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 3610, 3646-47 (amending TEX. WATER CODE ANN.
§ 36.113). Districts were given permission to exempt certain types of wells from obtaining
a permit. Id. § 4.32, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 3610, 3647-48 (amending TEX. WATER CODE
ANN. § 36.117) (These included domestic and livestock wells and wells used for hydrocarbon production, among others).

153
154
155

Id. § 4.30, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 3610, 3646-47 (codified in TEX. WATER CODE ANN.
§ 36.1071(c)( 3 )).
Id. § 4.33, 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 3610, 3648-49 (codified in TEX. WATER CODE ANN.
§ 36.112).
Hubert & Bullock, supra note 137, at 66.
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This sentiment is particularly striking considering groundwater's precarious status seventeen years later, coupled with the continued presence of capture.
The legislature did not replace the rule of capture, but groundwater legislation limiting its reach continued to evolve. SB 1 was followed by another omnibus water bill in
2001: Senate Bill 2 (SB 2).156 SB 2 was intended to update and fortify the initiatives
commenced in SB 1.157 "The legislation also reflected a continuation of disputes that
arose in the 1999 session about the establishment of single-county groundwater districts
and a growing interest in the issue of transporting groundwater outside district boundaries to provide water for thirsty cities."15 8 As with many water issues, SB 2 was contentious and required extensive negotiations to gain passage. 15 9
The bill enhanced the regulatory powers of GCDs by expanding their permitting and
enforcement powers.160 Most importantly, the bill provided for increased regulation of
well spacing to minimize interference between wells.161 Districts were also allowed to set
production limits based on tract size or production capacity by dictating acre-feet per
acre or gallons per minute. 16 2 These terms were a direct response to the Seventh Court
of Appeals's decision in South Plains LaMesa Railroad, Ltd. v. High Plains Underground
Water Conservation District No. 1, in which the court held that Chapter 36 did not give
districts the authority to deny a permit based on tract size.1 63
While allowing increased regulations in many ways, SB 2 also did the opposite by
prohibiting a district from rejecting a proposed permit specifically for export of groundwater out of the district.'16 In exchange, the district received the ability to levy an
export fee on that water. 165 The bill also streamlined the process for designation of
GMAs and PGMAs, which were originally described in SB 1, and set deadlines for their
designations.166 Although districts are generally restricted from purchasing groundwater
rights, they could do so for conservation purposes if the rights were permanently held in
trust. 167

156 Act of May 27, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 966, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 1991.
157 Lehman, supra note 136, at 110.
158 Ken Kramer, Senate Bill 2-Omnibus Water Legislation, SIERRA CLUB, http://texas.sierra
club.org/texaslegislature/EIS/sb2.html (last visited June 11, 2013).
159 See Gregory M. Ellis & Jace A. Houston, Senate Bill 2: 'Step Two' Towards Effective Water
Resource Management and Development for Texas, 32 ST. B. TEX. ENvT. L.J. 53, 53 (2002).
160 See Act of May 27, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 966, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 1991.
161 Id. § 2.50, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 1991, 2015-16 (amending TEx. WATER CODE ANN.
§ 36.116).
162 Id.
163 See South Plains LaMesa R.R., Ltd. v. High Plains Underground Water Conservation Dist.
1, 52 S.W.3d 770, 778-79 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2001, no pet. h.).
164 Act of May 27, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 966, § 2.52, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 1991, 2018
(amending TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.116).
165 Id. § 2.52, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 1991, 2018-19 (amending TEX. WATER CODE ANN.
§ 36.122).
166 Id. § 2.22, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 1991, 2003-04 (amending TEx. WATER CODE ANN.
§ 36.004).
167 Id. § 2.54, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 1991, 2020 (amending TEX. WATER CODE ANN.
§ 36.206). One of the enforcement mechanisms that was added was the ability to levy civil
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One existing issue that was compounded after SB 1 was continued proliferation of
single-county GCDs, which increased the number of districts overlaying the same aquifer.' 68 This created a potential source of conflict and confusion because each district
could create conflicting management plans for essentially the same water. SB 2 sought
to remedy this by establishing procedures for joint management of the shared aquifer by
groundwater

districts.169

Perhaps foreseeing future conflicts between the established common law created by
the courts and the increasing power given to groundwater districts by the legislature, SB
2 attempted to clarify the relationship. The bill amended the statute codifying groundwater ownership and added that ownership rights "may be limited or altered by" district
rules.170 Like the inclusion of tract-specific considerations for permitting, this modification was a response to the South Plains case.' 7 ' In its South Plains opinion, the court
stated that district permitting rules could contravene the common law rule of capture.1 72
The legislature wanted to clarify that the rule of capture could be limited by district
rules. Unfortunately, the language added by SB 2 drafters was not sufficient to circumvent future conflict between property owners and regulatory management. This became
particularly apparent with the continued development of the groundwater planning
process.

B. GCDS

AND THE GROUNDWATER

PLANNING PROCESS

Currently, there
The number of districts grew quickly after the passage of SB 1.'
are ninety-seven confirmed districts and three additional districts pending.174 "Over half
of the total land areas of Texas is within a groundwater conservation district . . . [and]
almost ninety percent of groundwater produced in Texas comes from counties with such
a district." 7 5
SB I and SB 2 gave GCDs broad regulatory authority. As mentioned, a GCD can
create a permitting system or promulgate other rules to
limit[ ] groundwater production based on tract size or the spacing of wells, to
provide for conserving, preserving, protecting, and recharging of the ground-

168
169
170
171

172
173
174
175

penalties for breach of district rules. Id. § 2.45, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 1991, 2012 (amending TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.102).
Compare AQUIFERS OF THE GULF COAST OF TEXAS, supra note 130, at 301, with GEORGE ET
AL., supra note 47, at 27.
Act of May 27, 2001, § 2.48, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 1991, 2013-15 (amending TEX. WATER
CODE ANN. § 36.108).
Id. § 2.31, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 1991, 2009 (amending TEX. WATER CODE ANN.
§ 36.002).
Ellis & Houston, supra note 159, at 56; see South Plains LaMesa R.R., Ltd. v. High Plains
Underground Water Conservation Dist. 1, 52 S.W.3d 770 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2001, no
pet. h.).
See South Plains LaMesa R.R., 52 S.W.3d at 779.
Lehman, supra note 136, at 104.
Groundwater Conservation Districts, supra note 134.
45 Douglas G. Caroom, Susan M. Maxwell, & Celina Romero, Texas PracticeSeries: Environmental Law § 14.2 (2d ed. 2005 & Supp. 2012).
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water or of a groundwater reservoir or its subdivisions in order to control subsidence, prevent degradation of water quality, or prevent waste of groundwater.176
Unless it falls into a recognized exemption, a well located in a GCD cannot be drilled or
completed without a permit.' 7 7 Examples of rules that individual GCDs have passed
include requiring the installation of well meters and mandatory reporting of pumping
quantities.' 17
Even with the proliferation of GCDs after SB 1 and their increased permitting authority imparted by SB 2, there was little immediate conflict between regulators and
users regarding a perceived invasion of property rights. This tension began to increase,
however, when the regional planning process brought harbingers of greater regulation,
which could affect an unfettered property right in water. This regulatory process, combined with a steady increase in demand, created the perfect storm between owners and
regulators.
The regional planning process as it stands today evolved through a series of legislative efforts, each subsequently responding to deficiencies or challenges that arose. GCDs
were first required to create comprehensive management plans in 1989; however, there
was no interface with other districts or the region as a whole.1'7 SB 1 was the first effort
to evaluate statewide water supply needs and consider how those needs could be met by
introducing regional planning.1s0 In addition to creating the process, the bill required
certain information be included in all groundwater management plans to ensure uniformity."s" Currently, all plans must specify objectives and performance standards, and
must include detailed procedures that demonstrate how the goals of the plan will be
achieved. 182
In addition to GCDs, GMAs have existed since the 1950s.183 A GMA is defined as
an area suitable for the management of groundwater resources.' 8 4 Although they now
play a large role in statewide planning, before 2001, their primary purpose was to enable
the creation of GCDs by petition.' 8 1 SB 2 repurposed GMAs as planning tools. The bill
required the Texas Water Development Board (TWDB) to designate GMAs to include
all major and minor aquifers within two years of the bill's effective date of September,
2001.186 The TWDB was directed to use aquifer boundaries or subdivisions of aquifer

§ 36.101 (West 2012).
Id. §§ 36.113, 36.1131. Although exempt wells do not require a permit, a GCD can require
landowner to register an exempt well with the district. Id. § 36.117(h)(1), (2).
178 See e.g., District Rules, HIGH PLAINS WATER DIST., http://www.hpwd.com/rules-andmanagement-plan/district-rules/ (last visited June 12, 2013).
179 Mace et al., supra note 28, at 1.
180 Hubert & Bullock, supra note 137, at 54, 57-58.
181 Id. at 57-58.
182 See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.1071(e) (West 2012).
183 Mace et al., supra note 28, at 1. The name "groundwater management area" has changed
over the years, but will be referred to throughout with this current moniker. See id.
184 TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 35.002(11).
185 Act of May 19, 1949, 51st Leg., R.S., ch. 306, 1949 Tex. Gen. Laws 559; Mace et al., supra
note 28, at 1.
186 Act of May 27, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 966, § 2.22, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 1991, 2003
(amending TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 35.004). Designating GMAs was originally tasked
176
177

TEX. WATER CODE ANN.

2013]

World's Worst Game of Telephone

275

boundaries to establish GMA boundaries.187 This is very different than the construct of
most GCDs, which usually follow political boundaries such as county borders.'<8 The
purpose of GMAs was to create administrative boundaries. Planning within a GMA is
done by the GCDs.
There are currently sixteen GMAs in Texas.'* 9 The number of GCDs within each
GMA varies.190 SB 2 commenced the process of linking a GCD's planning with all
other GCDs in a GMA.19 1 Recognizing the potential for conflict among GCDs regarding the appropriate management of groundwater, the bill directed GCDs within the
same GMA to share their groundwater management plans with each other.192 A GCD's
management plan to preserve historical or existing use must be consistent with its comprehensive management plan. 193 A district in the area could also call for joint planning;
however, it was not required.19 4
Policymakers have also attempted to link regional and district planning with the
statewide plan. For example, SB 2 created additional consideration requirements in the
regional water plans, including impacts of the plan on unique river or stream segments
on water quality. 19 Also, the TWDB would approve regional water plans only if the
plans included water conservation practices and drought management measures and were
consistent with the long-term protection of the state's water, agricultural, and natural
resources embodied in the guidance principles for the state plan. 196
Although SB 1 and SB 2 contemplated an integrated planning process, they did not
require it. It was not until 2005 that the planning process really took shape with the
passage of House Bill 1763 (HB 1763).197 HB 1763 made three major changes to the
planning process. First, it regionalized decisions on groundwater availability.19 8 Second,
it required statewide regional planning groups to use availability numbers generated from

to the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (formerly Texas Natural Resource
Conservation Commission). Id.
187 Id.
188 See Groundwater Conservation Districts, supra note 134.
189 Groundwater Management Areas, supra note 27. By 2001, predecessor agencies had designated nineteen groundwater management areas, which were dissolved when TWDB
adopted the current scheme of management areas covering the whole state. Mace et al.,
supra note 28, at n.9.
190 See Groundwater Conservation Districts, supra note 134.
191 See Act of May 27, 2001 § 2.48, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 1991, 2013-15 (amending TEX.
WATER CODE ANN. § 36.108).
192 Id.
193 TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.116(b) (West 2012). Protection of existing wells must be
tied to amount and purpose of prior use. See discussion infra Part V.A.

194 Act of May 27, 2001 § 2.48, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 1991, 2013-15 (amending
CODE ANN. § 36.108(b)).
195 Id. § 2.17, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 1991, 2000-01 (amending TEX. WATER
§ 16.053).
196 Id. § 2.18, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 1991, 2001 (amending TEx. WATER
§ 16.053).
197 Act of May 30, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S. ch. 970, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 3247.
198 Id. § 8, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 3247, 3254-56 (amending TEX. WATER
§ 36.108).
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the GMA process in their statewide water forecasting.199 Lastly, the bill seemed to authorize, but did not explicitly require, a cap on groundwater permitting. 200
Before 2005, GCDs and GMAs were permitted to plan jointly, but HB 1763 required
that the GCDs with each GMA actually coordinate.201 This was a tall order considering
there are numerous GCDs in each GMA-many with different theories of management
and sustainability. 202 GCDs had previously been allowed to define their own groundwater availability for their individual management plans, which made little sense geologically because many of the GCDs' plans applied to the same water source. 203 HB 1763
sought to remedy this through joint planning intended to generate desired future conditions (DFCs) for an entire management area. 204 DFCs were then used to calculate
managedavailable groundwater (MAO), which was estimated to be the amount of water
available for removal while still maintaining the DFC. 205 Districts could use MA~s to
structure pumping limits and other regulatory measures to be implemented to ensure that
the DFC is met. 206 Planning was meant to maintain the bottom-up procedures created
by past legislatures while also creating a big picture for Texas groundwater sustainability.
The first step in the new planning process was for the GCDs within each GMA to
determine their DFCs for the water resource. 207 A DFC is a way to determine what the
region wants the resource to look like in the future. 208 Management plans will flow from
this goal.209 The districts were required to use scientific data including TWDB's groundwater availability models to create their DFCs. 210 If a GMA covered more than one
aquifer or geographic area, individual DFCs could be established for each.211
Once a DFC was established, the TWDB prepared final models to translate that goal
into a quantity of water, or MAG, that could be extracted annually and over a fifty-year
period and still meet the DFC. 2 12 Then, "[a] district, to the extent possible, shall issue
permits up to the point that the total volume of groundwater permitted equals the man-

199 Id.

200 Id. § 11, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 3247, 3258 (amending TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.1132).
201 Id. § 8, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 3247, 3254-56 (amending TEX. WATER CODE ANN.
§ 36.108(c)).
202

Mace et al., supra note 28, at 2.

203 Id.
204 Id. at 3.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Act of May 30, 2005, § 8, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 3247, 3254-56 (amending TEX. WATER
CODE ANN.

§ 36.108).

208 Mace et al., supra note 28, at 3.
209 Act of May 30, 2005, § 8, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 3247, 3254-56 (amending TEX. WATER
CODE ANN. § 36.108(d-2)).
210 Id. § 5, 2005, Tex. Gen. Laws 3247, 3251-52 (amending TEX. WATER CODE ANN.
§ 36.1071(a)(8)).

211 Id. § 2, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 3247, 3249-50 (amending TEx. WATER CODE ANN.
212

§ 36.001(25)).
Mace et al., supra note 29, at 3; Act of May 30, 2005, § 8, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 3247,

3254-56 (amending TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.108(d)).
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aged available groundwater." 2 13 A possible cap on permitting bestowed significant regulatory power that was previously unauthorized except in certain special districts. 2 14
The most recent changes to the planning process came in 2011 with Senate Bill 660
(SB 660).215 Like the others before it, this legislation attempted to clarify outstanding
issues. For example, although the term DFC had been used for years, the legislation had
never defined it. SB 660 defined it to mean "a quantitative description ... of the desired
condition of the groundwater resources in a management area at one or more specified
future times."2 16 To provide additional guidance, the bill also explains that DFCs "must
provide a balance between the highest practicable level of groundwater production and
the conservation, preservation, protection, recharging, and prevention of waste or
groundwater and control of subsidence in the management area."2 1 7
In addition to clarifying the definition of DFC, the bill changed the term "Managed
Available Groundwater" to "Modeled Available Groundwater."21 8 The legislature made
this modification to more accurately reflect the term's meaning and demonstrate that the
numbers were based on the best data available and subject to data changes. Finally, the
bill added nine new factors that GCDs must consider when renewing or establishing
DFCs and required that management plan goals and objectives be consistent with
achieving applicable DFCs. 2 19
The continued development of the regional planning process and the apparent authorization of pumping caps to meet MAGs allowed districts to control withdrawals in a
way that created legal conflicts between limitations on pumping and the common law
rule of capture. While this friction was new to most GCDs, special districts were already
managing these conflicts.

V.

THE EDWARDS

AQUIFER: A

SPECIAL CASE

While districts grappled with the ever-changing planning process and how and
whether to implement a cap on pumping, the Edwards Aquifer Authority (EAA) was
already very familiar with this concept. The EAA is a legislatively-created special district formed in response to a federal court ruling on a federal Endangered Species Act
(ESA) claim brought by the Sierra Club.2 20 Because the couit found that excessive
pumping of the Edwards Aquifer was threatening several endangered species, the state
was obligated to create a firm pumping cap in this region long before it was a statewide
discussion.

213 Act of May 30, 2005, § 11, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 3247, 3258 (amending TEX. WATER
CODE ANN. § 36.1132).
214 Mace et al., supra note 28, at 3.
215 Act of May 29, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S. ch. 1233, § 1, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 3287, 3287
(amending various sections TEX. WATER CODE ANN.).
216 Id. § 14, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 3287, 3294 (amending TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.001).
217 Id. § 17, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 3287, 3297 (amending TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.108).
218 Id. § 16, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 3287, 3295 (amending TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.1071).
219 Id. § 17, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws at 3296 (amending TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.108).
220 See Act of June 11, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 626, § 1.02, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 2350, 2351.

278

A.

TEXAS ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 43:3

SIERRA CLUB V. LUJAN

The Edwards Aquifer is a karst aquifer located in Central Texas covering approximately 3,600 square miles. 221 The majority of water enters the aquifer along surface
streams in an area referred to as the "recharge zone." 2 22 The aquifer discharges naturally
into several springs including Comal and San Marcos Springs. 223 These springs are
headwater tributaries for the Guadalupe River, which flows from Central Texas to the
Gulf of Mexico. 2 24 Water is withdrawn from the aquifer primarily through groundwater
wells.225 Many interests depend on the aquifer, but the largest user is the City of San
Antonio, which depends on the aquifer as its primary water source. 226
Several endangered species also depend on the flow of these headwater springs for
their own survival. Among them are the Texas Blind Salamander and the Fountain
Darter.227 These and others threatened species were at the heart of the Sierra Club
lawsuit.228 During the 1950s drought of record, Comal Springs completely dried up,
which would not have happened without the additional depletion created by pumping. 229 Although San Marcos Springs did not totally dry up during the same time period,
its flow was considerably diminished due to pumping.230
Data presented at trial showed that, but for human withdrawals, the springs' natural
discharge would be stable. 23 1 Evidence showed that continued pumping would result in
extended no-flow periods for the springs in drought conditions.232 These dry periods
would threaten the survival of the species that live there.233 Despite these known connections between the aquifers and the springs, neither the state nor the GCDs had established pumping limits at the time of the litigation.
Section nine of ESA makes is illegal to "take" an endangered species. 234 "Take" is
broadly defined and includes anything that kills, harms, or harasses even a single individual animal designated as an endangered species, including harm or harassment of the
endangered species' habitat. 235 Section 4 of the ESA creates a nondiscretionary duty for
federal agencies to develop and implement a recovery plan for each endangered species,

221

Karst is a geologic landscape created by the dissolution of soluble rocks including limestone,
dolomite and gypsum characterized by sinkholes, caves, and underground drainage systems.
222 Hydrogeology of the Edwards Aquifer, EDWARDS AQUIFER AUTHORITY, http://www.edwards
aquifer.org/index.php/science-and-research/hydrogeology/ (last visited June 15, 2013).
223 Id.
224 Vivian Elizabeth Smyrl, Guadalupe River, TEX. ST. HIST. Ass'N http://www.tshaonline.org/
handbook/online/articles/mg0l (last visited June 15, 2013).
225 Sierra Club v. Lujan, No. MO-91-CA-069, 1993 WL 151353, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 1,
1993).
226 Darcy Alan Frownfelter, Edwards Aquifer Authority, in ESSENTIALS OF TEXAS WATER RESOURCES 17-9 (2nd ed. 2012).
227 Sierra Club, 1993 WL 151353, at *9-10.
228 Id.
229 Id. at *6.
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Sierra Club, 1993 WL 151353, at *9-10.
233 Id. at *6.
234 16 U.S.C § 1538(a) (2012).
235 16 U.S.C § 1532(19).
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unless it is found that it would not promote the conservation of the species. 236 Sierra
Club brought a lawsuit against the Department of the Interior and Fish and Wildlife
Service, one of the federal agencies tasked with species protection under the ESA, to
compel the Fish and Wildlife Service to take action based on its statutory obligation to
complete a recovery plan. 237 The judge agreed that the federal government failed to
implement the recovery plans or identify the springflow requirements for the survival of

the species. 2 38
As a result, the judge ordered Fish and Wildlife Service to determine the minimum
springflow for each of the springs needed to protect listed species. 239 More importantly,
Judge Bunton directed the Texas Legislature to provide the appropriate management of
the aquifer in such a way that the springflow would be maintained to protect the species.
"If the State of Texas fails or refuseld] to regulate withdrawals from the Edwards Aquifer," his court would implement management. 2 40 This threat paved the way for the Edwards Aquifer Authority Act (EAAA), enrolled just four months after the Sierra Club
judgment was rendered. 2 41
B.

CREATING THE

EAA

At the time of the Sierra Club lawsuit, two existing groundwater districts managed
Edwards Aquifer water. 242 These were the Edwards Underground Water District and the
Medina Country Underground Water District.2 43 These districts had all the requirements and authorities as other GCDs described above, which was minimal because they
preceded SB 1 and its progeny. Pumping from the Edwards Aquifer had increased from
30,000 acre-feet per year at the turn of the century to 500,000 acre-feet per year at the
time of litigation. 244
In response to the court's decision in Sierra Club, the Texas Legislature passed the
EAAA, which created the EAA as a special district.245 While authorized by the same
constitutional amendment as other districts, this GCD was granted additional authority
and regulations that others did not. 2 46 Although the primary concern of the Sierra Club
ruling was species protection in the springs, the EAA does not have the authority to
regulate springflow because surface water is within the jurisdiction of the state. 247 However, the EAA is required to manage the aquifer in such a way that springflow is
protected. 248

236 Sierra Club, 1993 WL 151353, at *10-11.
237 Id. at *11.
238 Id. at *10.
239 Id. at *33.
240
241
242
243
244

Id. at *34 (emphasis omitted).
Act of May 30, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 626, § 4.03, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 2350, 2372.
Sierra Club, 1993 WL 151353, at *4.
Id.
Id. at *6.
245 Act of May 30, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 626, § 1.02, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 2350, 2351.
246 Id. §§ 1.02, 1.14, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 2350, 2351, 2360.
247 Id. § 1.08(b), 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 2350, 2356.
248 Id. § 1.14, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 2350, 2360.
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The biggest difference between the EAA and other districts was the establishment of
a firm total pumping limit on the Edwards Aquifer. 249 The enabling legislation instructed the EAA to permit withdrawals not to exceed 450,000 acre-feet for each calendar year until December 31, 2007.250
For the period beginning January 1, 2008,
permitted withdrawals cannot exceed 400,000 acre-feet per year. 25' This number was
later increased to the current amount of 572,000 acre-feet per year. 252 Texas state law
mandates an exemption from permitting requirements for livestock or domestic wells
across the state. 253 The EAAA provided a similar exemption but required that all such
wells be registered. 25 4 Neither Chapter 36 nor the EAAA specifically restricts the district from limiting withdrawals from such wells.
The legislation also created a rubric for how permits were to be allocated. Permits
were primarily issued to those who could show they had used Edwards Aquifer water in a
beneficial way during the historic period. 25 5 If an irrigator used unmetered Edwards Aquifer water, a permit would be issued for two acre-feet a year per acre irrigated during one
year of the historic period, assuming all other permit requirements were met. 25 6 Historic
permit applications had to be received by March 1, 1994.257 Other than the stated
exceptions, it is illegal to pump water from the Edwards Aquifer without an EAA permit.
The EAAA recognized the potential conflict between the EAA permitting scheme
and common law concepts of groundwater ownership. It stated,
[A]ction taken pursuant to this Act may not be construed as depriving or divesting the owner or the land, or these ownership rights or as impairing the contract
rights of any person who purchases water . . . . The legislature intends that just
compensation be paid if implementation of this article causes a taking of private
property . . . .258
The drafters seemed to acknowledge that there was a limit on how much a regulatory
authority could restrain property rights, but the EAAA explicitly stated that this permitting initiative did not exceed that limit. Some were not convinced.

249
250
251
252

See id.
Id. § 1.14(b), 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 2350, 2360.
Id. § 1.14(c), 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 2350, 2360.
Act of May 28, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 1430, § 12.02, 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws 5848,
5901-02 (amending Section 1.11, Chapter 626, Acts of the 73d Legislature, Regular Session, 1993). At the time SB 3 was passed, the law still required the 400,000 acre-feet per

year provision; however, based on the rules in the EAAA, the EAA was required to permit
253
254
255

256
257
258

571,6000 acre-feet per year. Frownfelter, supra note 226, at 17-43. This change was an
effort to match the legislation to actual permits issued. Id.
TEx. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.117(b) (West 2012). A domestic and livestock well is allowed to produce up to 25,000 gallons of water a day. Id.
Act of May 30, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 626, § 1.33, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 2350, 2366.
Id. § 1.16, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 2350, 2361 ("An existing user may apply for an initial
regular permit by filing a declaration of use of underground water withdrawn from the aquifer during the historical period from June 1, 1972, through May 31, 1993.")
Id. § 1.16(e), 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 2350, 2361.
Id. § 1.16(b), 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 2350, 2361.
Id. § 1.07, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 2350, 2356.
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WATER

The EAA has generated conflict since its inception. One of the first of these conflicts appeared in the Barshop case. 25 9 In Barshop v. Medina County Underground Water
Conservation District, plaintiffs argued that the permitting system created by the EAAA
and implemented by the EAA violated their vested property right to withdraw water. 260
26
The plaintiffs complained "that the Act violates the takings clause in two ways." 1
First, they asserted that certain provisions of the EAAA would operate automatically
upon its effective date amounting to a taking. 262 Second, they claimed the EAA's application of the EAAA was unconstitutional.26
As written, the EAAA was to become effective September 1, 1993.264 Declarations
of historic use, which were required to receive a historic use permit, were due six months
later on March 1, 1994.265 However, a voting rights challenge delayed the effective date
of the EAAA beyond the historic use declaration deadline. 266 Plaintiffs argued that all
existing users would be forced to immediately cease water withdrawals because the deadline for them to apply for a permit based on past use had passed. 267
The Texas Supreme Court held that the legislation creating the EAA was not a
facially unconstitutional infringement or taking of landowner's groundwater property
rights.2 68 It reasoned that the legislative intent behind the date was for the historic
application deadline to be six months after the EAA's enactment date.269 Because the
enactment delay was unforeseen, the historic use deadline should also be postponed.270
Regarding when property rights vest, the court recognized the dichotomy between the
27
case law and the state's constitutional obligation to regulate groundwater withdrawals. 1
Recognizing the future challenge, the court stated, "[tihe issue of when a particular regulation becomes an invasion of property rights in underground water is complex and
multi-faceted";272 however, Texas had to wait another sixteen years before the state
supreme court ruled on that issue.

See Barshop v. Medina Cnty. Underground Water Conservation Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618
(Tex. 1996).
260 Id. at 625.
261 Id. at 628.
262 Id.
263 Id.
264 Act of May 30, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 626, § 4.02, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 2350, 2371.
265 Id.
266 Barshop, 925 S.W.2d at 625, 629.
267 Id. at 629.
268 Id. at 623.
269 Id. at 629.
270 Id. at 629-30.
271 Barshop, 925 S.W. at 626.
272 Id. at 626.
259
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MOVING FROM CAPTURE TO OWNERSHIP

Although capture had been maintained in Texas for over 100 years, the addition of
regulations and increased demand for water created many questions about the property
interest capture created. 273 One of the issues that persisted was determining when ownership actually began. Did rule of capture only give a landowner the right to use with
ownership commencing at the point of capture, or did a landowner have an ownership
interest in the water prior to production? As the court stated in Barshop, "parties fundamentally disagree on the nature of the property rights."274 The answer to this question
became critical in defining regulatory opportunities and constitutional limitations.275
Although a few cases danced around the issue, the Texas Supreme Court took the issue
up directly in Edwards Aquifer Authority v. Day. 2 76 The Day case framed the question of
ownership; however, an understanding of the cases that came before this landmark opinion is necessary to fully grasp how the courts previously discussed capture in light of
ownership.277

A. GUITAR

HOLDING

CONSERVATION

Co. v.

HUDSPETH

COUNTY

UNDERGROUND

WATER

DisTRICT

As groundwater regulation increased, so did questions regarding the authority of
GCDs to regulate in light of the common law right of capture. The question of property
rights and regulatory limitations reached the Texas Supreme Court in Guitar HoldingCo.
v. Hudspeth County Underground Water Conservation District.278 The case involved a
large landowner's challenge to a permitting scheme promulgated by a GCD. 2 79 The
Hudspeth County Underground Water Conservation District No. 1,280 which was established in the 1950s, adopted a new management plan in 2002 in an attempt to sustain
the Bone Springs-Victorio Peak Aquifer at historically-optimal levels through regulation of groundwater withdrawals.281

273 Johnson, supra note 148 at 4-8.
274 Barshop, 925 S.W.2d at 625.
275 See Marvin W. Jones & Andrew Little, The Ownership of Groundwaterin Texas: A Contrived
Battle for State Control of Groundwater, 61 BAYLOR L. REv. 578, 579-80, 592 (2009)
("[Because ownership of the water in place is not clear, it would occur to me that in the
future, there is a lot of opportunity for central control of that water." (Sen. Robert
Duncan)).
276 See Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. 2012).
277 See id.
278

Guitar Holding Co. v. Hudspeth Cnty. Underground Water Conservation Dist. No. 1, 263

S.W.3d 910, 915-16 (Tex. 2008).
279 Id. at 910.
280 This groundwater district is located in far West Texas, less than 100 miles east of El Paso.

281

This area is extremely dry with very little precipitation to provide surface
recharge opportunities. Despite annual rainfall of only eight to ten inches, this
historic agricultural economy made possible by groundwater irrigation. Id. at
Id. at 913-14. In 2000, prior to these new rules, the state auditor questioned
district was appropriately managing the aquifer. Id. at 913.

watering or
region had a
913.
whether the
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This plan included a permitting program "recogniz[ing] three types of permits: 1)
validation permits, 2) operating permits, and 3) transfer permits." 2 8 2 Existing wells that
produced water during a defined period were entitled to validation permits. 2 83 The system relied on historic use to allocated water permits. 28 4 The user was obligated to show
usage during the requisite time period.285 Irrigating landowners were entitled to a validation permit of four acre-feet of water per acre irrigated, subject to a district reduction to
three acre-feet.2 86 Non-irrigating owners were entitled to a validation permit equal to
"the maximum amount of water beneficially used in any one year during the [historic]
period." 2 87 With this system, the district issued permits based on past types of use without consideration of the landowner's intent as to future use.2 8 Therefore, an irrigator
could gain a permit based on historic irrigation even if her future intent was sale and
transport of the water out of the district.289

Unfortunately, this system pitted different types of users against one another because
the ability to obtain and then transfer water was predicated on past use. 2 90 For transfer
permits, those applying for completely new permits received fewer transfer rights than
those holding validation permits. 29 1 Guitar Holding Company, a large landowner, only
irrigated a small portion of land during the historic period and was therefore eligible for
fewer water permits than a group of permitted irrigators. 292 Guitar Holding Company
brought suit challenging the validity of the permitting rules.293
The Texas Supreme Court ruled that the protection of historic use authorized by
Chapter 36 was "tied both to the amount and purpose of the prior use." 2 94 If either of
those changed, the permit holder had to be treated like any other new applicant.295
Since no one had ever transferred water out of the basin, all transfers should be treated
as new uses and not attached to prior use validation permits.2 96 In reaching this conclusion, the court took issue with the Texas Water Code's definition of "use" and applied

282 Id. at 914. Operating permits, although authorized, had limited value because they could
not be used unless water rose above pre-irrigation levels.
283 Guitar Holding Co. 263 S.W. 3d at 914.
284 Id. at 914.
285 Id.
286 Id.
287 Id.
288 Guitar Holding Co. 263 S.W. 3d at 912.
289 Id. To obtain a transfer permit, a landowner must first have a validation permit. Id. at 914.
290 See id. at 914 (recognizing the "substantially greater" transfer rights that are granted to some
landowners through the rules of allocation that are based upon historic use).
291 Id. at 914-15.
292 Id.
293 Guitar Holding Co. 263 S.W. 3d at 915.
294 Id. at 916. Historic use is a statutorily allowable factor for a district to consider in limiting
groundwater production within the district. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.116(b)
(West 2008).
295 Id. at 916.
296 Id. at 917.
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this to the district rules. 2 97 Some commentators criticized that this application may have
constituted legislating from the bench.298
. While this case may not, on its surface, involve ownership, it does directly relate to
the potential property right created by law. If a large landowner, such as Guitar Holding
Company, is only eligible to pump a very small portion of water from underneath its
land, does such restriction violate the right created by East and subsequent cases? It is
hard to imagine that this issue did not play into the court's analysis, even if it was not
the precise question before it. In fact, the opinion mentioned potential disparity between land ownership and water rights.299 The ability to have water for sale and transfer
is a potential economic boon for the rights holder. Ultimately, it was perceived unfairness in the loss of this income through lost transfer earnings that may have driven the
decision.300
This case may have been the first hint of a lack of deference to the regulatory bodies
created by the legislature. The heavy emphasis on the constitutional amendment in
many of the previous cases, which gives all the power to regulate to the legislature, was
not even mentioned. The Guitar opinion may also provide a window into the court's
thoughts on the role of private property rights as-they relate to state regulatory authority.
While the Court recognized that the Texas Water Code delegated management of
groundwater to the GCDs and vested them with broad regulatory powers, some view the
Court's action as a willingness to involve itself in the details of management. 301 Conflicts between property rights and regulatory authority continued to arise as regulation
increased, eventually forcing courts to face the dispute directly.

B.

DEL

RiO

AND BRAGG

As groundwater litigation continued, the question of ownership was destined to reappear. In City of Del Rio v. Clayton Sam Colt Hamilton Trust (City of Del Rio), litigants
asked the court to resolve the nature of groundwater ownership.302 Unlike other cases,
this case did not involve a groundwater district-it was actually a contract claim.303
Clayton Sam Colt Hamilton Trust (Trust) sold the City of Del Rio (Del Rio) a 15acre plot of land located within its 3,200-acre tract.3 0 4 The conveyance deed reserved
"all water rights associated with said tract," but did not reserve a right of entry to produce the water. 305 Later, Del Rio installed a pumping well and began withdrawing
groundwater.306 The Trust brought suit against the city claiming Del Rio violated the

297 See id. at 918.
See Stuart R. White. Guitar H-olding': A Judicial re-Write of C2hapter 36 of the Texasn'
WatrCode? 62 BAYLOR L. REv. 313, 331-38 (2010).
299 See Guitar Holding Co., 263 S.W.3d at 914.
300 See id. at 918.
301 See White, supra note 298, at 335-38.
302 City of Del Rio v. Clayton Sam Colt Hamilton Trust, 269 S.W.3d 613 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 2008, pet. denied).
303 See id. at 614-15.
304 Id. at 614.
305 Id. at 615.
306 Id.
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deed and that the Trust owned the groundwater.307 Del Rio argued that the Trust could
not legally retain ownership of the water when it deeded the property because the surface
owner did not have absolute ownership.308
San Antonio's Fourth Court of Appeals held that the rule of capture was a corollary
to absolute ownership.309 The Trust argued that, if ownership could only be perfected by
capture, an owner's water rights would be limited by the size of her "bucket." 310 The
court agreed with the Trust that the water could be reserved before it was captured and
that to rule otherwise would essentially bring all water rights conveyances to a halt.3 "i
Water, once produced, could be transferred. Since reservation of the groundwater was
possible, the Trust had the legal right to bifurcate the water from the surface and exempt
it from the transfer, which was evidenced in the language of the deed.3 12
Another ownership case that is still moving through the courts is Bragg V. Edwards
Aquifer Authority.313 Unlike Del Rio, this case is a more typical case of a permit applicant
suing a permitting authority. The Braggs requested groundwater permits from the EAA
for two pecan farms, totaling about 625 acre-feet per year.3 14 The EAA denied one
permit because there had been no pumping within the statutory historical use period.3 15
For the other property, the EAA limited the permit to 120 acre-feet per year, based on
the two acre-feet per year standard provided in its rules. ' 6
Using the severe economic impact test set out by Penn Central TransportationCo. v.
New York City, the Medina County district court held EAA's failure to issue the requested permits was a takings and that the Braggs were entitled to compensation of
$732,493 .317 San Antonio's Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Citing the
recently Day case regarding ownership, which was released while Bragg was pending, the
Fourth Court agreed that the requested permit denials were unconstitutional.318

Al-

though the appellate court agreed with the trial court regarding the Penn Central analy-

307 City of Del Rio, 269 S.W. 3d at 615.
308 Id. at 615-16.
309 Id.

310 Id. at 617.
311 Id.
312 City of Del Rio, 269 S.W. 3d at 618.
313 Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Auth., No. 06-11-18170-CV (38th Jud. Dist., Medina County,
Tex., filed May 7, 2010).
314 Id. The Braggs also filed a federal civil rights suit against the EAA. Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Auth., 342 F. App'x 43, 45 (5th Cir. 2009).
315 Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Auth., No. 06-11-18170-CV (38th Jud. Dist., Medina County,
Tex., filed May 7, 2010); Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Auth., 342 F. App'x 43, 45 (5th Cir.
2009).
316 Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Auth., No. 06-11-18170-CV (38th Jud. Dist., Medina County,
Tex., filed May 7, 2010); Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Auth., 342 F. App'x 43, 45 (5th Cir.
2009).
317 Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Auth., No. 06-11-18170-CV (38th Jud. Dist., Medina County,

Tex., filed May 7, 2010).
318 Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Auth., 2013 WL 4535935, at *1 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
2013).
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sis, they differed on the methodology for calculating damages.3'9 The case will likely be
appealed to the state supreme court so, although the final outcome of this case is still
unknown, it immediately highlights the importance of the Day decision and its intrinsic
regulatory limitations.

C. THE

DAY DEPARTURE

It took over 100 years, but the Texas Supreme Court finally faced the question of
when ownership in groundwater begins and what, if any, are the constitutional limitations of GCD regulations. Although Day was heard in February of 2010, the Court's
written opinion took another two years. 3 20 In anticipation of the Court's decision, and
perhaps in an effort to circumvent it, the Texas Legislature passed Senate Bill 332 (SB
332), which attempted to clarify the relationship between districts and ownership rights
before the Court ruled.321 Although SB 332 was freshly promulgated when the Court
issued its decision, the ruling went beyond the language in the bill with regard to defining a groundwater right. Despite the fact that the Court had been critical of right of
capture in its past rulings, the Day decision made little mention of the wisdom of the
system as it proceeded to create a vested right in groundwater in place.
1.

SB 332
When the 2011 legislative session commenced, the Court had been contemplating
the Day case for a year. As the state awaited a ruling, there were growing concerns on
both sides regarding the possible outcome. With SB 322, the legislature attempted to
settle the question pending before the Court in advance of the ruling by amending the
Texas Water Code groundwater ownership section. 322 The first draft of the bill, submitted by Senator Fraser, proposed to modify the existing language by adding the phrase "a
landowner, or the landowner's lessee or assign, has a vested ownership interest." 323 The
bill went on to provide that nothing in the code could "be construed as granting the
authority to deprive or divest a landowner" of that interest except through reasonable
rules promulgated by a district.3 2 4

Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Auth., 2013 WL 4535935, at *21-22 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
2013). Interestingly, despite the fact that the legislature strictly dictated the terms by which
the EAA could issue permits, the court held that the agency, not the state, was responsible
for any compensatory resulting in a constitutional infringement. Id. at *3-8.
320 Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. 2012).
321 See Act of May 27, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 1207, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 3224. The Texas
Legislature meets on odd numbered years for 140 days.
322 Senate Comm. on Natural Resources, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 332, 82d Leg., R.S. (2011).
Before the change, the code read, "The ownership and rights of the owners of the land and
their lessees and assigns in groundwater are hereby recognized and nothing in this code
319

shall be construed as depriving or divesting the owners .

.

. of the ownership or rights,

323

except as those rights may be limited or altered by rules promulgated by a district." TEX.
WATER CODE ANN. § 36.002(a) (West 2010).
Senate Comm. on Natural Resources, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 332, 82d Leg., R.S. (2011).

324

Id.
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Throughout session, the bill was negotiated and ultimately the final version was
stripped of the word "vested." 325 Although private property interest groups heavily promoted the explicit inclusion of "vested," the pertinent part of the final bill read: "the
legislature recognizes that the landowner owns the groundwater below the surface of the
landowner's land as real property." 326 This interest does not provide an owner the right
to capture a specific amount of groundwater below the surface of that landowner's
land.3 27
Unlike the Fraser original, which provided little recognition of the districts' authority, the final version amended Texas Water Code section 36.002, giving it considerably
more detail. The final version of the bill stated that an owner's ability to drill and pump
water does not "affect the ability of a district to regulate groundwater production as
authorized under Section 36.113, 36.116, or 36.112 or otherwise" under Chapter 36.328
The newly amended statute also recognized the ability of districts to limit drilling based
on well spacing or tract size as adopted by the district, echoing the Chapter 36 additions
in response to the South Plains case. 329 These terms explicitly clarified that this bill did
not change the districts' authority created by SB 2.330
Finally, the bill specified that districts are not required to adopt a rule that "allocate[s] a proportionate share of available groundwater for production from the aquifer
based on the number of acres owned by the landowner."33 Districts are instructed to
consider ownership and rights during their creation and enforcement of rules.332 The
bill also contained a special provision for the EAA and other special districts, stating
that the "ownership" of groundwater as described in the first part of the bill "does not
affect the ability [of the EAA] to regulate" as authorized by the legislature.333
The enrolled bill attempted to codify the complicated history of both common law
and legislative initiatives to regulate groundwater. It did not seek to limit districts' authority and the efforts made over the years to empower them. Although the bill analysis
for the original version reflected that the bill's purpose was to define the owner's vested
right in groundwater, the word "vested" did not appear in the bill as promulgated. Further, it is telling that the final version provided considerably more recognition of
groundwater districts' authority than its predecessor.33 4 It seemed as though the issue

325 See Act of May 27, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 1207, § 1, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 3224, 3224
(amending TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.002(a)).
326
327
328
329

Id.
See id. (amending TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.002(d)(3)).
Id. (amending TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.002(d)(2)).
Id. (amending TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.002(d)(1)).

330 See Act of May 27, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 966, § 2.50, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 1991,
2015-16 (amending TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.116).
331
332
333

Act of May 27, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 1207, § 1, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 3224, 3224
(amending TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.002(d)(3)).
Id. § 2, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 3224, 3225 (amending TEX. WATER CODE ANN.

§ 36.101(a)(3)).
Id. § 1, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 3224, 3225 (amending
§ 36.002(e)(1)).

TEX.

WATER

CODE ANN.

334 See Senate Comm. on Natural Resources, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 332, 82d Leg., R.S.
(2011).
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had been solved, but the Court was still mulling over Day and it was unclear how the
decision would be handled in light of SB 332.

2.

EDWARDS AQUIFER AUTHORITY

v.

DAY

Previous case law and legislative efforts to regulate groundwater culminated in the
Day case. On February 24, 2012, the Texas Supreme Court finally weighed in on
groundwater ownership in a way it never had before.33 5 The Court ruled that landowners have a vested ownership right in groundwater below their land even before it is
captured.33 6 While many of the impacts of the Day decision have yet to be seen, the
33 7
opinion can be evaluated within the context of what came before it.
In 1994, R. Burrel Day and Joel McDaniel (Day) purchased land within the EAA's
jurisdiction.3 38 Their intent was to grow oats and peanuts as well as graze cattle on the
land. 33 9 Although the land did not contain a working well, there was a lake used for
irrigation that was filled by an intermittent creek, overland flow, and some artesian
groundwater flow.340 Day applied for a permit to allow pumping of 700 acre-feet of water
a year based on evidentiary statements that 300 acres were irrigated during the historic
period as well fifty acre-feet for recreational use in the lake.341 As instructed by the
enabling legislation, initial regular permits were based on beneficial use of water during
the historic period.342
In 1997, Day received information from the EAA that there was a preliminary finding that he was entitled to the 600 acre-feet of water based on their showing of previously irrigated land.343 In 1999, after receiving approval from the EAA to change the
diversion location, Day drilled a new well even though the EAA had not yet officially
ruled on his permit. 344 In November 2000, the EAA denied the application because well
"withdrawals . . . were not placed to a beneficial use."3 4 5
Day protested the EAA decision to the State Office of Administrative Hearing
(SOAH).34 6 During discovery at SOAH, a previous landowner testified that 150 acres
were irrigated during the historic period using a sprinkler, which drew water from the

335 See Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. 2012).
336 Id. at 831.
337 The first permit challenge ruling to be issued since the Day opinion found in favor of the
landowners, which raises concerns about possible limitations on regulation. Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Auth., 2013 WL 4535935, at *1 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2013).
338 Day, 369 S.W. 3d at 818.
339 Id.
340 Id. There was a well drilled on the land in the mid 195 0s, which was used for irrigation
until the early 1970s when it collapsed and the pump was subsequently removed. The well
was under sufficient pressure that continued to flow. The previous owner constructed a
ditch to convey the artesian flow to the creek, which fed the lake. Id.
341 Id. at 820. Existing irrigation was allowed a permit for no less than two acre-feet a year for
each acre of land irrigated in one calendar year during the historical period. Id.
342 Id. at 820 (Tex. 2012).

343 Day, 369 S.W. 3d at 820.
344 Id. The well cost $95,000. Id.
345 Id. at 820-21.
346 Id. at 821.
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lake and was therefore surface water.3 47 Only seven acres were irrigated using exclusively
well water.348 The administrative law judge determined that water from the lake, which
included some overland flow from the artesian well, was surface water and not under
EAA authority.4 9 Based on the testimony, the administrative law judge determined
that the maximum beneficial use of groundwater to earn a permit was fourteen acre-feet,
calculated from the seven acres that used groundwater directly from the well for irrigation. 35 0 The EAA agreed and issued a permit in that amount.5 1
Day appealed this finding, claiming, in part, that the decision amounted to a taking
in violation of the Texas Constitution. 35 2 The trial court granted summary judgment for
Day regarding the characterization of the 150 acres of irrigated land. However, the EAA
prevailed on summary judgment on all constitutional claims, including the takings
claim, based on the argument that landowners have no vested, protectable property right
in groundwater prior to capture.35 3 The court of appeals agreed with the EAA and affirmed the determination of fourteen acre-feet, but remanded the case on the takings
claim, stating that "'landowners have some ownership rights in the groundwater beneath
their property .

.

. entitled to constitutional protection."3'54

The EAA, Day, and the State of Texas-whom the EAA impleaded as a third-party
defendant-filed petitions for discretionary review with the Texas Supreme Court.35 5
The Court granted the petitions, and concluded, in accordance with SOAH and the
appellate court's finding, that the EAA did not err by limiting Day's permit to fourteen
acre-feet.3 56 This decision was based in part, as it had been in previous forums, on the
fact that the character of the water changed from groundwater to surface water as it
flowed into and was contained by the surface lake.3 5 7 In addition, there was no evidence
provided to show that the 150 acres were irrigated on a consistent basis.35 8 The primary
use of the lake appeared to be for recreational purposes.35 9
The issue that garnered the most attention was whether Day had a constitutionallyprotected interest in the groundwater in place.360 The court ultimately held that he
did. 3 6 1 However, it remanded to determine whether a taking had occurred in this
case. 362 Despite what many parties claimed before the opinion was issued, the Court was

347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358
359
360
361
362

Id.
Day, 369 S.W.3d at 821.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Day, 369 S.W.3d at 821.
Id. at 821 (quoting Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 274 S.W.3d 742, 756 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 2008), affd, 369 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. 2012)).
Id. at 822.
Id. at 822, 823.
Id. at 822. The explicit exception to this is when a bed and banks permit has been issued
for the downstream transport of groundwater using a natural watercourse. Id.
Id. at 823.
Day, 369 S.W.3d at 823.
See id. at 823-43.
Id. at 833.
Id. at 843.
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clear in stating that, although ownership in place had long been the rule for oil and gas
in Texas, the determination of when groundwater ownership began was a question of
first impression.3 6 3 Although the Court acknowledged that rule of capture could exist
without ownership in place, it held that, in Texas, the two are one and the same. 364
The court continued to recognize the role of GCDs and the constitutional amendment that allowed for their creation. 3 65 The opinion also reiterated the regulations that
dictate a district's authority to regulate wells.366 The Court referred to recently-promulgated SB 332 to show that the legislature had recognized this relationship between owners and regulators.367 However, the Court could not say with certainty that SB 332
created a vested ownership right in groundwater. Instead, the opinion stated "the Legislature appears to mean ownership in place."368 It made no mention of the conspicuous
absence of the word "vested," which, although present in previous drafts, was ultimately
removed. 369 The opinion also reiterated the court's thoughts in Bragg regarding recognized the EAAA provision requiring "just compensation be paid if implementation of
[the Act] causes a taking of private property." 370 The Court read this to mean that the
legislature recognized that limiting water rights for a public use might be a taking; however, the court did not say that the permitting system as written in EAAA would require
compensation.3 7 1 Instead, despite the attempted carve-out for the EAA in SB 332, the
court directed standard takings analysis on any pumping regulations created by a GCD,
including those implemented by the EAA. 372
Notably missing in the opinion, in stark contrast to previous cases, was any criticism
of capture as a management system or any recommendations that the legislature should
change it. This becomes more conspicuous considering that the author of the majority
opinion in Day was Justice Hecht-the same Justice who wrote the concurring opinion
in Sipriano. In Sipriano, Justice Hecht strongly advocated for the replacement of capture
with a more reasonable system such as the Restatement.373
Much of the briefing from the EAA and some amicus briefs focused on the importance of protecting the EAA's ability to permit without fear of an onslaught of takings
claims.374 It was argued that any threat to the permitting scheme would violate the

363
364
365
366
367
368
369

See id. at 828.
Day, 369 S.W.3d at 823, 828, 832.
Id. at 833-43.
Id. at 814, 833-43.
Id. at 832.
Id.
Compare Senate Comm. on Natural Resources, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 332, 82d Leg., R.S.
(2011), with Act of May 27, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 1207, § 1, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws
3224, 3224 (amending TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.002(a)).
370 Day, 369 S.W.3d at 843.
371 See id.
372 See id.
373 Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75, 83 (Tex. 1999) (Hecht, J.,
concurring); see discussion supra Part IIl.B.
374 See, e.g,., Brief of Angela Garcia and Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner and Cross-Respondent Edwards Aquifer Authority, Edwards Aquifer
Auth.. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. 2012) (No. 08-0964), 2010 WL 591444.
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intention of the state legislature when it created the EAA.3 75 Some amicus briefs attempted to extrapolate the consequences that a takings finding would have on other
GCDs.3 7 6 The amicus brief of Angela Garcia and the Environmental Defense Fund
listed the long history of legislative actions created to limit groundwater mining, including district creation and the regional planning process.3 77 These briefs argued that recognition of a landowner's constitutionally vested right in groundwater would threaten
the ability of the EAA and other GCDs to manage groundwater in a sustainable way.3 78
The Court disagreed with these arguments, stating that during its existence, there
had only been a handful of takings claims against the EAA.37 9 While the holding in Day
was certainly important to groundwater advocates and property owners alike, it represented a significant change in the Court's tone with regard to its deference to the legislature and its willingness to weigh in regarding groundwater regulation. Although the
Court had criticized capture in past decisions, no criticisms appeared in this opinion, and
it is unclear what caused this shift.

VII. WHY

THE CHANGE?

To many, the Day decision was a logical evolution of the Court's protection of the
rule of capture first established in East. However, when evaluating the judicial and legislative history as a whole, the Day decision marked a departure from the previous trend of
court decisions. Throughout history., although the Court respected the East decision in
name, it regularly deferred to the increased regulation created by the legislature and
often encouraged it. Dicta from several decisions indicates that previous courts felt that
right of capture might not be a wise allocation scheme for a growing state and that more
regulation was needed. 380 This was particularly true in Sipriano, where the concurrence
noted that the East court's concerns were no longer valid.3 81 Although Day does not
technically overturn previous case law because the specific issue of ownership was one of
first impression, the direction of the opinion varies significantly from previous groundwater cases, thus creating implications for future water and environmental issues.
The East court chose rule of capture in part because it did not have any legislative
direction and did not understand groundwater characteristics.382 The opinion indicated
that, had the legislature previously acted on groundwater, the court would have deferred
to that action.3 8 3 Just a few years after the East case, the legislature did act by passing

375
376
377
378
379
380
381

See, e.g., id.
See, e.g., id.
Id. at *1-2.
Id. at *9.
Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 843 (Tex. 2012).
See Friendswood Dev. Co. v. Smith-Sw. Indus., Inc., 576 S.W.2d 21, 22, 29 (Tex. 1978).
See Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75, 82 (Tex. 1999) (Hecht, J.,
concurring).

382 See Houston & T. C. Ry. Co. v. East, 81 S.W. 279, 280-81 (Tex. 1904).
383 See id. at 280.
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the conservation amendment placing the role of groundwater regulation with the legislature even though a common law precedent was already set.38 4
For a period of time, the courts deferred to the legislature regarding the allocation of
Texas's groundwater. Subsequent cases leaned heavily on legislative efforts to regulate
use and plan for the future. This is even true of cases that did not involve direct challenges to the rule of capture. In City of Corpus Christi, the Texas Supreme Court recognized that groundwater was no longer "occult" as it was described in East; however, the
court maintained deference to the role of the legislature established by the constitutional
amendment and clarified the relationship between the court and lawmaker by stating,
"[t]he power certainly does not lie with the courts to usurp the legislative function."13
The Court noted that, because the legislature had not limited transportation of groundwater based on excessive water loss, the Court could not create such a rule.386 The
Court did state, perhaps encouragingly, that the legislature was currently in session so
state legislators would have the chance to create such a law if they were so inclined.387
Similarly, in Friendswood Development, the Court stated, "We agree that some aspects
of the English or common law rule as to underground waters are harsh and outmoded,
and the rule has been severely criticized since its reaffirmation by this Court in [City of
Corpus Christi]."^@8 However, feeling bound by stare decisis, the Court maintained capture, but used recent legislative action as an "opportunity to discard an objectionable
aspect of the court-made English rule" and included subsidence through negligent pumping as a limit to capture. 389 Both of these cases reflect the court's recognition of its
obligation to abide by East while still supporting increased regulation and indicating that
a change to capture might be necessary.
Sipriano was the Court's first modem opportunity to change the common law rule of
capture. Although the Court ultimately upheld capture, language hinting at opposition
to the system itself was prominent throughout the Sipriano opinion. 390 The court warned
that while groundwater allocation was the responsibility of the legislature, if the legislatuie was not willing to do its job, the court would have no trouble stepping in.3 91 All
indications were that the court was encouraging the legislature to move away from right
of capture, "or else." Sipriano was argued before the court shortly after SB 1-Texas's
first omnibus water bill-was passed, which gave additional authority to GCDs. 392 The
Court felt it important to allow such landmark legislation time to take effect.393 This
deference to SB 1 can be interpreted as an affirmation of increased groundwater regula-

384 See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59(a); see also Sipriano, 1 S.W.3d at 77.
385 City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 276 S.W.2d 798, 803 (Tex. 1955).
386 Id. ("The power certainly does not lie with the courts to usurp the legislative function and
say what types of conduits and reservoirs may be used for the transportation and storage of
water, lawfully obtained and lawfully used.")
387

Id.

388 Friendswood Dev. Co. v. Smith-Sw. Indus., Inc., 576 S.W.2d 21, 28-29 (Tex. 1978).
389 Id. at 30.
390 See Sipriano, 1 S.W.3d at 80.
391

See id.

392 Id. at 79-80; see also Act of June 1, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 1010, § 4.30, 1997 Tex. Gen.
Laws 3610, 3646-47 (amending TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.113).
393 Sipriano, 1 S.W.3d at 79-80.
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tion from the court.3 94 In addition to the majority opinion, Justice Hecht's concurrence

was particularly critical of capture and advocated for its replacement.3 95 He stated that
"it has become clear, if it was not before, that it is not regulation that threatens progress,
but the lack of it."3 9 6 It is an interesting statement to consider when reading the Day
opinion, which Justice Hecht also authored.
Finally, the Court reached the Day case. As in previous cases, the Court upheld the
right of capture; however, unlike those decisions, Day contained no discussion of the
constitutional amendment or the importance of legislative authority, nor mention that
capture may need to change in the future.3 9 1 While it recognized SB 332 and GCDs, the
Court appeared to want to reign in the power that was previously encouraged, even
reading "vesting" into SB 332.398 There was no discussion of changed circumstances, as
was seen in Sipriano, which is particularly notable because the frequency of water issues
has only increased since that ruling. Instead, the Court's holding in Day could arguably
inhibit the legislatively created districts from doing their job as defined in their promulgating directives. 399 In particular, the ruling could endanger the EAA, which was a
legislatively-created special district that issued permits based on legislative direction.
This outcome is particularly ironic considering that the motivation behind the EAA's
creation was a desire to remedy the lack of regulation that had led to damaging over
pumping.
It is a challenge to understand the shift from the language of the previous cases to
the Court's decision in Day. There are several possible reasons why the Court ruled as it
did in Day. First, the Day decision could have been based on a determination that the
courts are the appropriate source for property law clarifications. Despite the presence of
legislatively-created districts' rulemaking, some common law considerations may continue to lay with the courts. The decision may also be a testament to the current importance placed on private property in Texas, as evidenced by legislative initiatives and
other court rulings. Finally, perhaps the Court was simply trying to align Texas's groundwater regime with that of oil and gas. If this is true, it raises significant questions about
whether the Court also intended other aspects of oil and gas law, such as correlative
rights, to extend to groundwater. Understanding the motivation of the Day opinion is
an important step in predicting how the Court may rule in future cases involving upcoming water and other environmental issues.

A.

COURTS v.

LEGISLATURE

Over the last hundred years, American law has shifted from a system dominated by
common law to one that is primarily statute driven.400 A major driver of this shift was

394 See id.
395 Id. at 82 (Hecht, J., concurring).

396. Id.
397 See generally Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. 2012).
398 See id. at 832.
399 See Brief of Angela Garcia and Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner and Cross-Respondent Edwards Aquifer Authority, Edwards Aquifer
Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. 2012) (No. 08-0964), 2010 WL 591444 at*.1-2.
400 CALABRESI, supra note 77, at 44.
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the proliferation of agencies and other regulatory authorities tasked with rulemaking.401
Agencies were usually given broad powers to apply the laws of the day, add specificity to
legislative goals, and adjust regulations to the changing times; however, increased
statutorification of this kind can create questions of jurisdiction.402 This is the conflict
in Texas groundwater. Here, the constitutional amendment extends jurisdiction of the
police power over natural resources to the legislature.403 Pursuant to the amendment,
GCDs were created to be the regulators.404 However, this system was enacted after a
common law rule was already present and continued contemporaneously with litigation
concerning similar issues. These dual tracks raised questions about which entity - GCDs
or the courts - had the authority to define and enforce groundwater and associated property rights.
The creation of an administrative body with regulatory authority does not divest the
courts from all jurisdiction over the body's actions. 40 Concurrent jurisdiction between
courts and agencies has always been allowed by the judicial system. 406 Courts may still
have authority in some common law areas in addition to common law expressly retained
by the judiciary.407 Constitutional adjudications remain with courts. 408 For example, all
property is held subject to the valid exercise of the state's police power. 409 It is settled
that, when regulations go beyond the valid exercise of police power, it is an unconstitutional taking of private property. 410 This constitutional question creates judicial authority over the regulatory body to interpret if a taking occurred; however, this evaluation
can only occur once a vested right has been established.41"
This is distinguishable from the Day case. Certainly, Texas courts have the right to
determine if a regulation exceeds the police power, but the court in Day actually defined
the property right itself, which must be determined before a takings analysis can take
place.412 The current focus is whether this was proper based on precedent or whether
the court should have deferred to legislative efforts to define and regulate groundwater
401 Id. at 45.
402 Id. at 44-45, 52.
403 TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59(a).
404 TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.0015 (West 2012).
405 CALABRESI, supra note 77, at 52; Israel Gonvisser, Primary Jurisdiction: The Rule And Its
Rationalizations, 65 YALE L. J. 315, 329 (1956) ("The trouble is that if the primary jurisdiction rule is to apply whenever there is an expert adjudicating body available, then the rule
must have unlimited applicability in the regulated industries. Logically, this leaves the
courts no jurisdiction in that area at all.")
406 Michael Botein, "Primary Jurisdiction: The Need for Better Court/Agency Interaction, 29
RUTGERS L. R. 867, 876 (1975).
407 CALABRESI, supra note 77, at 163-64.
408 Botein, supra note 406, at 871; CALABRESI, supra note 77, at 163-64.
409 Sheffield Dev. Co. v. City of Glenn Heights, 140 S.W.3d 660, 670 (Tex. 2004).
410 See Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 838-39 (Tex. 2012).
411 See Stone v. Tex. Liquor Control Bd., 417 S.W.2d 385, 385-86 (Tex. 1967) (holding that
there is no right to judicial review of an administrative order unless a statute violates a

vested right).
412 The subsequent Bragg decision provides a clear example of a more typical property rights
interpretation. Based on the decision that groundwater was vested, the court attempted to

determine if existing regulation ran afoul of existing property rights. Bragg v. Edwards Aqui-
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rights as it had in the past. To answer that question, one must first determine if the right
in question was once reserved by the courts or delegated exclusively to the legislature.
The Texas Supreme Court stated that, "[w]here the issue is one inherently judicial in
nature . . . the courts are not ousted from jurisdiction unless the Legislature, by a valid
3
statute, has explicitly granted exclusive jurisdiction to the administrative body."41 The
same court repeatedly stated that the conservation amendment placed groundwater regulation exclusively with the legislature and, by proxy, with GCDs. 41 4 Previous groundwater decisions deferred to legislative regulations for that reason. 4 15 In contrast, Day did
not. It could be argued that maintaining right of capture constituted deference; however, Justice Hecht's own words in Sipriano counter that notion. "It is hard to see how
maintaining the rule of capture can be justified as deference to the Legislature's constitutional province when the rule is contrary to the local regulation that is the Legislature's
preferred method of groundwater management."4 16 In contrast, the Day opinion included no reference to the amendment or the concerns regarding capture voiced in
Sipriano.
It is arguable that Day did not implicate deference because the Court felt that determining a property right was a common law principle reserved for the judiciary.4' Texas
oil and gas law serves as a good guidepost regarding the differentiation between the
court's authority and other regulatory bodies in assigning or amending property rights.
Although the Texas Railroad Commission (RRC) is vested with broad powers, it has no
power to determine property rights.418 Authority to resolve title disputes or determinations of subsurface trespasses is maintained by the judiciary.4l9 The RRC is allowed to
manage where or whether a well can be drilled, but is not permitted to determine owner420
ship of oil and gas or how proceeds from sales can be apportioned between owners.
The holdings in these cases explain that the authority of the legislatively-created Texas
Railroad Commission is limited to the state's goals of "preventing waste and conserving
natural resources." 421

413
414
415
416
417
418
419
420
421

fer Auth., 2013 WL 4535935, at *1 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2013). This would not
have been possible, had the Day court not decided to extend those rights.
A.W. Gregg v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., 344 S.W.2d 411, 415 (Tex. 1961) (emphasis
added).
See, e.g., City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 276 S.W.2d 798, 800-01 (Tex.
1955).
See, e.g., id. at 803, 805 (refusing to limit bed and banks allowances based on waste because
the Texas Constitution placed the authority to do so with the legislature).
Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75, 83 (Tex. 1999) (Hecht, J.,
concurring).
See CALABRESI, supra note 77, at 163-64; Mary A. Keeney, Primary and Exclusive Agency
jurisdiction: Impact on Court Litigation, 10 TEX. TECH. ADMIN. L.J. 471, 495 (2009).
Jones v. Killingsworth, 403 S.W.2d 325, 328 (Tex. 1965).
A.W. Gregg v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., 344 S.W.2d 411, 415 (Tex. 1961).
56 TEX. JUR. 3D Oil and Gas § 737.
Seagull Energy E & P, Inc., v. R.R. Comm'n of Tex., 226 S.W.3d 383, 389 (Tex. 2007); see
TEX. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. § 85.201 (2011). Determining what issue belongs to which
entity is not always a straightforward analysis. For example, in Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v.
Garza Energy Trust, the court held that, although law of trespass was a property claim for
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While it is true that some legal power lies with the courts and not with the legislature, the legislative precedent and the court's language contradict the premise that this
issue was maintained by the courts in the context of groundwater. First, the legislature
was vested with management. Then, on several occasions, the Court specifically called
on the legislature to increase groundwater regulations. In his Sipriano concurrence, Justice Hecht, then an advocate for more regulation, evaluated reasonable use as a potential
alternative to capture. 422 Although he remarked that reasonable use was not a perfect
solution, he thought it preferable to the current regime. 423 Since the Sipriano ruling, the
legislature has increased regulatory authority through a series of bills and GCD-promulgated regulations.424 If the Day court had followed its own precedent, it would have
deferred to the legislature citing the absence of the word "vested" in SB 332 and the
special exception the bill included for the EAA, which was clearly meant to offer them
additional protection in a regulatory review.
B.

PRIVATE PROPERTY

RIGHTS

Many hailed the Day decision as another victory for private property owners. Celebrants included Texas state officials as well as special interest groups. 425 Each of these
factions viewed the ruling as a welcomed constraint on the unfettered growth of regulations limiting property rights.426 The State Comptroller's Office stated, "[t]he court's
opinion ... provides a capstone for decades of efforts by the Texas Legislature to defend
and protect private real property rights."427 Although Texas has a history of property

422

the courts, determining the value of oil and gas drained by hydraulic fracturing is more
appropriate at the agency level. 268 S.W.3d 1, 14-16 (Tex. 2008).
Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75, 80 (Tex. 1999) (Hecht, J.,

concurring).
423 Id.
424 See discussion supra Part IV.B.
425 See e.g., Bruce Wright, A Victory for Private Property Rights: Texas Court Decision Affirms
Right to Water, TEX. COMPTROLLER OF PUB. ACCOUNTS, WiNDOW ON ST. Gov'T (May 7,
2012), http://www.window.state.tx.us/comptrol/fnotes/fnl204/water-rights.php;
Regan
Beck, Texas Groundwater Rights Continue to Take Center Stage, TEX. FARM BUREAU (May 24,
2012), http://txagtalks.texasfarmbureau.org/texas-groundwater-rights-continue-to-takecenter-stage/.
426 Wright, supra note 425; George Grimes Jr., Texas Private Real Property Rights Preservation
Act: A Political Solution to the Regulatory Takings Problem, 27 ST. MARY'S L.J. 557, 557-78
(1996). The recent ruling in Bragg reiterates courts' focus on private property rights. Bragg
v. Edwards Aquifer Auth., 2013 WL 4535935, at *1 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2013).
Although the Penn Central test requires an examination of the nature of the government
action, the court of appeals placed little importance on this prong in comparison to the

attention given to the reasonably back expectations of the individual plaintiff. Bragg v.
Edwards Aquifer Auth., 2013 WL 4535935, at *17-22 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2013). In

427

fact, the former only warranted two paragraphs of the opinion. Id. at *21-22. This preference of protecting the rights of one over the good of the whole embodies concerns that
were expressed during the Day debate. See e.g,., Brief of Angela Garcia and Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner and Cross-Respondent Edwards
Aquifer Authority, Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. 2012) (No. 080964), 2010 WL 591444.
Wright, supra note 425.
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rights legislation, individual rights have not been the focus of groundwater regulations.
At the very least, there was an attempt to balance individual rights with the sustainability of the resource in a way that benefitted the whole state.
Private property rights have always been important to Texans. 428 Perhaps it is be42 9
It
cause the state has a higher percentage of privately-held land than any other state.
may also stem from the independent nature of Texans. Whatever the reason, Texas's
lawmakers and courts have attempted to protect property rights since early in the state's
history. Article I of the Texas Constitution established the sanctity of private rights
stating, "No person's property shall be taken, damaged, or destroyed for or applied to
public use without adequate compensation being made."430 In addition to this overarching protection, Texas continued to promulgate legislation to protect property rights.
Most of these bills were passed in reaction to regulatory changes or court decisions that
were interpreted as threats to private rights. At times, Texas's deference to private property rights has been criticized because it valued those rights higher than the public
good.43 1
In 1995, the legislature passed the Texas Private Real Property Rights Preservation
Act. 432 The bill was motivated by increased regulations in many sectors, including the
environment.433 "The Act represents the Texas legislature's acknowledgment of the importance of protecting private real property interests."43 4 The bill required governmental
entities to consider whether takings of private real property may result from their actions. 435 Failure to do so could lead to litigation or invalidation of the governmental
action. 436 Under the Act, a property owner can sue the government entity that issued a
regulation if the regulation diminished property value by at least 25%.4
While Texas has always valued private property rights, recent legislation demonstrated that their protection has never been so paramount. After the landmark 2005
Supreme Court Kelo opinion, in which eminent domain was permitted for a "public use,"
Texas was one of the first states that attempted to enact response legislation.438 In 2011,

428 See e.g., Kate Galbraith, Property Owners Seek to Block Wind Power Lines, TEX. TRIB. (Apr.
13, 2010), http://www.texastribune.org/texas-environmental-news/environmentalproblems-and-policies/property-owners-seek-to-block-wind-power-lines/.
429 Susan Combs Column on Property Rights, TEX. COMPTROLLER SUSAN COMBS, (Sept, 4,
2012), http://www.susancombs.com/media/susan-combs-column-property-rights.
430 TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 17.
431 Jacqueline Lang Weaver, The FederalGovernment as a Useful Enemy: Perspectives on the Bush
Energy/EnvironmentalAgenda From the Texas Oilfields, 19 PACE ENvT. L. REV. 1, 39 (2001)
("[T]he secular religion of private property rights has become so strong in Texas that [the
oil industry advocacy group] itself is not powerful enough to sway legislative opinion in
support of the public good . . . ."). See supra note 425.

Private Real Property Rights Preservation Act, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 517, § 1, 1995 Tex.
Gen. Laws 3266. (codified in TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. (West 2004)).
433 Grimes, supra note 426, at 557.
434 Tex. Att'y Gen., Private Real Property Rights Preservation Act Guidelines, § 1.11 (2011).
435 Id. § 1.12.
436 Id. § 1.14.
437 Grimes, supra note 426, at 560.
438 See Tex. H.B. 2006, 80th Leg., R.S. (2007); Veto Message of Gov. Perry, Tex. H.B. 2006,
Tex. 80th Leg., R.S. (2007).
432
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Texas passed a law to further protect private property interests. 4 39 Senate Bill 18 (SB
18) limited what could qualify for the "public use" for the purposes of eminent domain. 440 The bill also sought to protect the landowner from underpriced compensation
and included protections for circumstances if the project, which necessitated the eminent domain proceeding, was not completed.441
Property rights have also seen increased protection in the Texas courts. 442 With an
elected judiciary, concerns often arise that political sentiments can find their way into
court rulings.443 Day may be just another example of the rise in property rights interests
held by Texas citizens along with the general rejection of additional regulations. Again,
this was a shift in tone from previous case law. Although, previous groundwater cases
involved property rights, they also mentioned the importance of a management system
that benefitted the greater good of the state as well as protection of the individual.444
Both East and Sipriano involved conflicts between landowners, so the Court attempted to balance the interests by giving each landowner an equal right to capture the
water under his or her property.445 Even in Sipriano, which did not involve a regulatory
body, the Court seemed concerned about the continuation of protecting individual property rights in light of growing demand and controversy. 446 The court qualified its protection of the right by indicating that it might be appropriate for change at a later date.447
In fact, a primary reason for not changing common law was deference to the regulatory
changes added by SB1, not protection the individual rights. Again, this consideration
was not reflected in the Day opinion.
If the Day decision was, in fact, a victory for private rights, it is worth noting what
the Court did not say. The Court did not say that the facts presented in Day constituted

439 Act of May 5, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S. ch. 81, § 1, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 354 (codified in TEX.
GOVT CODE ANN.).

440 Id. § 2, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 354 (amending TEX. GOVT CODE ANN. § 2206.001).
441 Id. H§ 8 & 19, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 351, 358, 361 (amending TEX. GOVT CODE ANN.
§§ 21.0113, 21.101).
442 See Val Perkins, The Texas Supreme Court's Emphasis on Private Property Continues, THE
Hous. LAW. 42 (May/June 2012) (chronicling recent Texas Supreme Court decisions confirming private property rights at the expense of state or local regulations); Jennifer Hiller,
Supreme Court Won't Hear Pipeline Case, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Feb. 24, 2013,
http://www.mysanantonio.com/business/article/Supreme-Court-won-t-hear-pipeine-case-43
03191.php.
443 See Justicefor Sale, Synopsis, FRONTLINE, PBS.ORG, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline
/shows/justice/etc/synopsis.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2013).
444 See Houston & T. C. Ry. Co. v. East, 81 S.W. 279 (Tex. 1904); Sipriano v. Great Spring
Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75 (Tex. 1999). In keeping with Day's limited discussion on
the need to manage groundwater, the subsequent Bragg opinion gives little attention to the
importance of sustaining water resources although the court acknowledged that Plaintiffs
were growing a water intensive crop in a drought ridden area. Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer
Auth., 2013 WL 4535935, at *21 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2013).
445 See discussion supra Part Il.A-B.
446 See Sipriano, 1 S.W.3d at 80.
447 See id.
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a taking.448 Texas courts have followed federal case history for takings claims.449
Neither the Texas courts nor the United States Supreme Court has established a bright
line test for a taking analysis when there is not a loss of total economic value; however,
the general rule is that state government conduct constitutes a taking when it invades or
physically appropriates property, or when it unreasonably interferes with the right to use
and enjoy property. 4 0 In Day, the court applied the facts to the Penn Central test and
held that there was not enough evidence to warrant summary judgment for Day on the
takings claim.4§1 Although the case was remanded on that issue, the Court's analysis
indicated that the permit would not meet the takings standard based on their application
of the facts to the Penn Central factors.412 While there are some signals that the Day
decision might have been motivated by private property protections there is another
interpretation. It is possible that the court was just trying to simplify an already complicated system.

C. A

MOVE TOWARDS MORE REGULATION: THE OIL AND GAS MODEL

The motivation for the Day decision may be found in the Court's own words. The
vesting of rights in place could have been an effort to align the groundwater process with
oil and gas law and thus provide additional regulations. Texas established the right of
capture for oil and gas many years ago. 453 However, unlike in the groundwater context,
the parameters of the right of capture in the oil and gas arena are well defined.
Texas courts long ago established that a landowner holds a vested interest in the
minerals in the ground. This right is subject to the same constitutional amendment discussed in previous sections.45 4 Instead of regionalized GCDs, the legislature created a
statewide authority, the RRC, to manage minerals through the promulgation of rules and
regulations.415 The RRC is specifically authorized to conserve the natural resources by
determining whether wells may be drilled and how much oil or gas may be produced
from permitted wells, as well as promulgating and enforcing density and spacing rules.456
Although the RRC is tasked with securing "the state's goals of preventing waste and
conserving natural resources," it also limits production to protect similar rights held by
neighboring property owners. 45 These are called correlative rights.45 8

448 Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 843 (Tex. 2012). Compare Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Auth., 2013 WL 4535935, at *21 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2013).
449 Grimes, supra note 426, at 575-76.
450 Westgate, Ltd. v. State, 843 S.W.2d 448, 452 (Tex. 1992).
451 Day, 369 S.W.3d at 839-43.
452 See id. at 843.
453 See Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 107 Tex. 226, 176 S.W. 717 (Tex. 1915).
454 See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 59(a); Brown v. Humble Oil Co., 83 S.W.2d 935, (Tex. 1935).
455 TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 85.201 (West 2012).
456 56 TEX. JUR. 3D Oil and Gas § 737. 457 About the Oil & Gas Division, R.R. COMM'N OF TEX., http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/about/divisions/aboutog.php (last updated Aug. 2, 2007).
458 "The term 'correlative rights' is merely a convenient method of indicating that each owner
of land in a common source of supply of oil and gas has legal privileges as against other
owners of land therein to take oil or gas therefrom by lawful operations conducted on his
own land; that each such owner has duties to the other owners not to exercise his privileges
of taking so as to injure the common source of supply; and that each such owner has rights

300

TEXAS ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL.

43:3

The doctrine of correlative rights was established as a means to prevent waste and
confiscation. The doctrine gives every property owner the opportunity to recover the oil
and gas in or under his land.459 The owner's right of capture is subject to correlative
rights.460 While early oil and gas precedent allowed unfettered pumping without liability
for drainage of a neighbor's property, this was eventually found to be at odds with a right
of capture doctrine.461 If there is no remedy for a landowner who is harmed by losing
their minerals to another, the property right becomes illusory.462 The Texas Supreme
Court approved correlative rights in the right of capture for minerals and it is currently
enumerated as one of the RRC's statutory goals; therefore, regulation to protect correlative rights is not a taking.463 One of the reasons correlative rights were extended to
property owners was because experts can now approximate the amount of oil and gas in
place in a common pool, and determine what is recoverable by each tract owner under
certain operating conditions.464 This was essential in a harm determination and was not
always possible in the early years of the doctrine.465
Language throughout the Day opinion demonstrated the Court's attempt to align
groundwater allocation with the statewide treatment of oil and gas. Because ownership
of groundwater was an issue of first impression, the court turned to well-established oil
and gas law to guide its analysis.4 66 The opinion identifies similarities between the two
resources.46 7 Using its reasoning in Texas Co., the Day court supported the decision to
own groundwater in place in spite of its fugacious nature. 468 In the end, the language
used to describe the current state of groundwater ownership came directly from an oil
and gas holding.469
In contrast to oil and gas jurisprudence, past groundwater cases did not address correlative rights and these rights have not been explicitly added by the legislature.470

459

460
461
462
463

464
465
466
467
468
469
470

that other owners not exercise their privileges of taking so as to injure the common source
of supply."' Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558, 583 (Tex. 1947) (citing 1 Summers, Oil and Gas, Perm. Ed., § 63).
Susana Elena Canseco, Landowners' Rights in Texas Groundwater: How and Why Texas Courts
Should Determine Landowners Do Not Own Groundwater in Place, 60 BAYLOR L. REV. 491,
515 (2008).
Elliff, 210 S.W.2d at 583.
Canseco, supra note 459, at 515.
Id.
Elliff, 210 S.W.2d at 582; About the Oil & Gas Division, R.R. CoMM'N OF TEX., http://www.
rrc.state.tx.us/about/divisions/aboutog.php (last updated Aug. 2, 2007). Regulations promulgated to protect correlative rights do not constitute a taking of property. Ohio Oil Co.
v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 209-10 (1900).
Elliff, 210 S.W.2d at 561.
Id. at 581.
Edwards Aquifer Authority v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 828-32 (Tex. 2012).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 831-32 (quoting Elliff, 210 S.W.2d at 561).
See Houston & T C. Ry. Co. v. East, 81 S.W. 279, 281 (Tex. 1904) (linking the denial of
correlative rights in part to the secret-and occult nature of groundwater making enforcement of such rights difficult). An additional difference between water and minerals is
Texas's oil and gas interests are also subject to taxation. Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 107 Tex.
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Therefore, before Day, there was no remedy for a landowner whose water was drained by
another user if the water was used for legitimate purposes.4 7' The Court in Day, however, argued that the very limited rules established in East, which disallow malice or
wanton conduct, imply that some form of correlative rights are available for groundwater.472 The Court stated that this limitation is comparable to the oil and gas prohibition on waste, although the term "waste" has been used differently in the oil and gas
context than the word "malice" has been interpreted in water cases. In fact, groundwater cases have allowed significant amounts of waste under rule of capture despite any
impact on neighboring owners.473 In addition, previous interpretations of capture concluded that correlative rights did not exist in Texas groundwater law.4
The Court in Day also attempted to equate the RRC goal of protecting correlative
rights with EAAA provisions by arguing that the permitting plan provides an applicant
with a "fair share" of water.475 However, in making that argument, the Court did not
cite to the EAAA promulgating regulations, and a review of that legislation reveals no
reference to the words "fair share" or "correlative rights." Even if the EAAA permitting
system is read broadly to provide a fair share to applicants, that is really only true as to
those who can show a historic, beneficial use, unless the Court is referring to the domestic and livestock exemption. It is difficult to parallel either the domestic exception or a
limited historic use right to what is meant by "fair share" in an oil and gas context.
Unlike situations where new permits are tied to historic use, in oil and gas, any leaseholder is entitled to a fair share of the minerals regardless of whether previous development occurred.
Courts defining oil and gas property rights did not view drainage or correlative rights
to be "at odds" with the rule of capture.47 6 Instead, they redefined the parameters of the
rule by clarifying that it did not sanction negligent or wasteful practices and included the
fair share or correlative rights principal.477 Relying on this definition of the oil and gas
property right, courts rejected owners' claims that regulations signed to prevent waste or
protect correlative rights constituted a "taking" of their property.478
By invoking the oil and gas law analogy in Day, the Court has potentially provided
an answer to future takings challenges aimed at groundwater regulation.479 Specifically,

471
472
473

474

475
476
477
478
479

226, 176 S.W. 717 (Tex. 1915). Based on the Day court's recognition of the behavioral
similarities between groundwater and oil and gas, it is possible that taxation should also be
considered in the groundwater context. Certainly, as in oil and gas, the presence of a
valuable resource below the surface would increase the value of the land above it.
See East, 81 S.W. at 281.
Day, 369 S.W.3d at 825-26.
See City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 276 S.W.2d 798, 803, 805 (Tex. 1955)
(refusing to define the actions presented in the case as waste because the court felt that
determination of that definition was the duty of the legislature).
See Dylan 0. Drummond et al., The Rule of Capture in Texas-Still So Misunderstood After All
These Years, 37 TEx. TECH L. REV. 1, 70 (2004); Friendswood Dev. Co. v. Smith-Sw. Indus.,
Inc., 576 S.W.2d 21, 22, 24 (Tex. 1978) (citing East, 81 S.W. 279).
Day, 369 S.W.3d at 830-31.
See Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558, 583 (Tex. 1947).
See id.
See id.
See Day, 369 S.W.3d at 832.
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if water rights are defined as vested but subject to the rule of capture, which includes
waste prevention and correlative rights, then regulations based on those parameters are
not, in general, a taking of that property right.40 When looking at the court's reasoning
in Day, it seems as though the Court is not opposed to an expanded application of
correlative rights and appears to believe that some currently exist.48 I By equating the
regulations of the RRC with what can be imposed on groundwater, it is possible that the
Court intended for damages related to waste to be extended to groundwater in the same
way they are used in oil and gas. 482 Judging from Justice Hecht's language in Sipriano,
increased regulation is a more effective way to protect a resource than less regulation.483
Perhaps Day is the Court's avenue to allow additional regulation, just as it had
threatened to do in previous cases.
While additional constraints on capture may be wise, simply extending correlative
rights to groundwater by overlaying the definitions used in oil and gas creates challenges.
The oil and gas regulatory regime has been well established since the early 1900s. 484
Meanwhile, the full suite of laws that govern groundwater were established through a
piecemeal evolution beginning in 1904.485 While application of oil and gas rules in the
groundwater context may have been a workable solution a hundred years ago, attempting to do it now only generates more questions than answers.
In addition to legal challenges, there are many geologic and social differences as
well, which the Court recognized.48 6 Although both oil and water are located and move
underground, unlike oil and gas deposits, most groundwater aquifers recharge, which can
both help and hinder attempts to align regulations between the sectors.48 7 Perhaps the
most important distinctions are the social differences between the two substances. Oil
and gas, while definitely important economically, cannot match the social value of
water. Because of the constant and growing need for water, long-term goals will be
different for each. Existing legislation in both sectors reflects these varying objectives.488
Throughout case law, the court has recognized the need for water sustainability and
stated that addition regulations were necessary, yet Day seemed to ignore those concerns. 489 Despite the reasoning, both obvious and discreet, that led to the Day decision,
courts will continue to answer questions as they arise, and the legislature will be forced
to conform its regulations to this new definition of capture in hopes that Texas's groundwater resources can be sustained into the future.
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482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489

See id. at 825-26.
See id.
See id.
See Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75, 82 (Tex. 1999) (Hecht, J.,
concurring).
See Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558, 583 (Tex. 1947).
See discussion supra Parts II-III.
See Day, 369 S.W.3d at 840-41.
See id. at 841.
See discussion supra Part IV.
See discussion supra Part III.B.
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VIII: CONCLUSION

Texas groundwater management has a long history of intertwined court decisions
and legislation. Although the common law rule of right of capture was established over
100 years ago, the rule has been modified based on the conservation amendment to the
Texas Constitution, which authorized the legislature to manage groundwater. Court decisions regarding groundwater issues deferred to both the conservation amendment and
subsequent legislative efforts to plan and manage groundwater.
The growth of the regional planning process paired with increased demand raised
questions regarding when ownership began. Courts never stated whether ownership was
vested in place or if the water must first be captured. The answer to this question was
critical to understanding the extent to which regulations would be appropriate without a
constitutional violation. The Texas Supreme Court's decision in Day provided the answer. In that regulatory challenge, the Court clearly stated that, like oil and gas, right of
capture was synonymous with absolute ownership. Consequently, regulations that exceeded the police power would be an unconstitutional taking.
The Day opinion marked a divergence from previous groundwater case law. Although upholding capture was consistent, the Court's treatment of capture and deference
to the legislative efforts to cap pumping was distinctly different from prior opinions.
While past cases indicated that capture should be changed due to changing circumstances in the state, the Day court did not address this issue and instead aligned groundwater law with oil and gas.
There are three possible reasons why the Day court departed from precedent. First,
the court may have been determining a property right, which was still within the authority of the court despite the constitutional amendment. Even in instances when primary
authority is placed with lawmakers, determination of certain common law principles are
reserved to the court. Second, the Day decision may have been another in a list of cases
prioritizing private property rights. Finally, by aligning groundwater with Texas oil and
gas law, the court may have been attempting to extend correlative rights where they
were not previously present. In oil and gas law, absolute ownership of the minerals
includes consideration of conservation and neighboring rights. By defining the right in
this way, regulations that seek to protect either or these are protected from a takings
claim in most circumstances. Although, correlative rights have not previous been present in groundwater law, perhaps they will be now.
Amy Hardberger is an Assistant Professor, St. Mary's University School of Law. She would
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